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CHAIRMAN, CURTIS R.

t

opportunity to welcome each of
Retirement Committee's inter
As most of you are
illegality of striking, or
unresolved.

e

The California

unanswered and the California

•

e

question through legislat
I want to tell you t

e

up here, each witness will
I would like for them to

1

res

1)

The underlying caus

2)

Possible soluti

3)

The anticipated
public government·

4)

Ways to
ess
legality of st i

s:

0

s
f

t

- 2 It should be understood that the purpose of today's
hearing is not to resolve the issue, but only to provide selected
witnesses with a forum to express t

ir individual opinions on the

state of the law.
We know that there will be many attempts to bring bills
before the Legislature to take away the right to strike for public
sector employees.
The Committee is aware that there are numerous points of
views relative to the legality of public sector strikes.

The staff

has tried to devise an agenda to reflect, in part, these diverse
views, although not all public sector interest groups or viewpoints
will be presented today.
Before we begin, I would li

to state that those indi-

viduals who may feel, after the end of the session, that they want
to come forward and say a few words, time permitting, we will
allow that.
I would like to introduce some of the people up here.

Mr.

Jim Bald lS the Minority Consultant, Jim is to my far right, philosophically and in reality.

Vern Oliver, Deputy Legislative Counsel

is here and is going to give us his views on various and sundry
things.

Robbin Lewis-Coaxum, the Consultant to the Committee.

The

Senior Consultant is the gentleman with the receding hairline to my
far left, Mr. Dave Cox.

This is Teri Hanna, my Secretary.

The first person we're going to ask to come up is Bonnie
Bogue, Assistant Director, California Public Employee Relations Program from Berkeley.

I would like very much to ask you to speak right

into the mike because the proceedings are being taped this morning.

I would like for you to g

you r

arne

r -

sent and then proceed with your test
MISS BONNIE BOGUE:
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:
MISS BOGUE:

o
Go

morn

I appreciate the

share some of the information that

prog

California at Berkeley has been gat

•

t
e

r

rs

l

ast

CPER Program is a research and informat on s
of California devoted to following
labor relations.

be her

i

ars~

e Un

en s

1

y

ic sec

We publish a quarter y

ice calle

CPER and most of the information t

tod

g

1

has been published in that Journal.
I've been asked by your staff to

lifornia.

about the occurence of public sector stri
CPER reports on strikes and lesser wor

ar

0

a

s s ck ou

sit ins, paper wars, blud flus, etc.,
records of them over the past several
members of the Committee with a pac

ars.
t of

tabulations of strikes in California's
12-year period, from 1970 through t

1c s

y

presen

I).

out t

ence o

I would like to talk first
and secondly point out some gener

c

t

it e

s

s

state of

law governing public employees stri
As you'll be able to see
public sector in California

om t

ations, the

se

ities, coun ies

1

t

the universities, and the state itself -

t

experienced a total of 405 strikes

12 yea s

t

lie sector

s

inning with

1970.

We've had as few as 15

e calendar year, that was

in 1971, and as many as 76

at was in 1979.

These strikes range

s

or the very popular one-

of only a few hours,

o

- erm, hard-fought

stoppages lasting weeks or even

e longest strike on

record was a ferry boat wor
days.

rs

979 which lasted 108

s

Of the 405 strikes, 116 were
Some strikes

o

ers simply being replaced by new
those on record.

or less duration.
lly ended, with the str
res

we have at least four of

We've had at le

1979 BART stoppage.

layer lockout -- the

Although t

st

called it a strike, the

1

union claimed it was a lockout

loyment insurance judge

agreed with the union on that i

granted benefits to the af-

fected employees on the ground t

was not a strike but a lockout.

It might be useful to

e strike experience among

different categories of empl

ee

giving you are drawn from

t

es that I will be
le

ont of you.

Police and fire stri

as frequent as strikes by

other local and state government
occur.

Fifty-nine strikes of po

prison guards, and f

efig

9 s

1s f

153
s

s

e 1970, ranging

1979 when there were 17

7

about 27% of all local governmen
safety service workers.

cers, deputy sheriffs,
re

strikes can be compared to t
government employees over t

ce

er

om one year when we had none
safety service stoppages.

, but they nonetheless

s

ty service
miscellaneous local

f time, so that only
strikes involved

I reiterate that a

11

shift, sickout or protest, rat
safety service strikes are of
safety service strikes were
ever, non-uniformed employees
often, since about 35% of m see
have been also of the one-day
There have been 137 st
college districts, compared to
employees.

1

The comparison is m

that there are approximately tw c
there are local government
37

been popular in the schools a
school strikes being of the one
I believe there are
throughout the state, plus a
transit system through jo

t

This relatively small group of
32 stoppages over this 12-year pe
impact on the statist

s in t

tend to have a bigger impact

e

they're usually both long-term
employees; and 2) there tend to

e

since some districts have had s

e

that this tendency toward mul
e

definitely not common among loc
who tend to just have one stri

s

6 But generally speaking, most employers experience just one strike
and that's it, so far.
To put California's strike experience in perspective, it
might be helpful to look at statistics of public sector strikes in
other major, industrial states.
ures for the years 1972-1980.

I have available comparative figIn that 9-year period, California

had 352, compared to 506 in Michigan, 179 in New York.
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

I have a question.

Those states out-

side the State of California, you say they had no strike legislation
passed through their houses?
MISS BOGUE:

There is a great variety of legislation a-

mongst the various states.

The 3 states for which I was able to

gather comparative statistics, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania,
had a variety of legislation.

Now Michigan, which had 506 strikes,

as I recall has no strike legislation, but not particular penalties
attached to striking.

It just says strikes are unlawful.

New York

has that, although they have specific penalties for those who strike.
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:
MISS BOGUE:

How many strikes would you say?

Michigan had 506, New York had 179,

Pennsylvania had 702 and California had 352 in that comparative
time frame.

Pennsylvania has a provision that legalizes some

strikes and not others.

All 3 have binding arbitration for safety

services as an alternative to strike.
I don't have exhaustive statistics for other states.
it would be helpful, I might be able to gather them for you.
They're provided through the BLS in various publications and we
were able, yesterday, to drag out 3 as a comparison.

If

CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

g

trial states?
MISS BOGUE:

are

and industrial development and

s

because I thought it would g
parative trend for Californ
and then 500 in Michigan,

7

I would like to turn now
the general legal context in whic
I am sure the committee members are
California statute that makes

1

employees to strike, with the
who are prohibited from striking
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

HovJ

had in the State of California
have any idea?
MISS BOGUE:
have been any.

In the last

And I don't have a

r

compared to other safety services.

I

you'd like.
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

t

d

like to know.
MISS BOGUE:

Fine, I'l

o

something to you on that.
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:
strikes have they had?
law.

How

But, I

0

s
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MISS BOGUE:

No, firefighters, that particular statute

refers only to firefighters, it does not refer to police agencies.
And the statistics that I've given you in the tables lump firefighters and police officers together.
firefighters.
affect.

There are strikes by

In my experience I don't think that it's had much

I think that there are other reasons for firefighters

striking and the existence of that statute has not had, in my
experience, a particular affect on whether they occur or what
happens if they do.

But statistically, I don't have any infor-

mation for you.
The common law, in the United States, it has been
generally held that public employees do not have the right to
collectively bargain or to strike unless they've been authorized
to do so by a legislative enactment.
In 1969, the State Court of Appeal adopted that principle for California local government employees in the case
Almond vs. County of Sacramento.

That holding has been reaf-

firmed in several subsequent appellate court rulings.

Only one

category of public employees in the state has been granted the
right to strike -- the State Supreme Court in 1960 found that
the language contained in the Los Angeles transit district's
enabling statute implicitly granted the right to strike.

As a

result, a few other transit districts with similar labor relations
provisions have assumed that their employees also enjoy the legal
right to strike.
Until 1979, the State Supreme Court did not speak
against the right to strike question, so that the prevailing law

has been that public employees
right to strike.

In 1979, t

the high court stated that
legality of public employee st
issue was "an open question."
sion as to the legal status of str
speaks to that "open quest

•

we

rulings which clearly state t
right to strike.

However, t

Supreme Court's comment has
The way the law has d
several subcategories of publi
expressly denied the right to

t

some, but not all, expressly
and judicial interpretation; 3)
to legislative silence, but a
without a legal right to strike,
possibly state and higher educati
jurisdiction of the Public Empl

I

en

legislative grant or denial of t
are subject to the jurisdict
in a state of evolution.
The statistics make it c
patchwork of legal interpretation
regardless of their technical
therefore, what difference doe
strike make?

t

1

- 10 The difference is -- what kind of deterrent does the
law provide against so-called ill

al strikes?

sanctions can be imposed on those

strike?

What kind of
That is, how is

the law enforced and to what effect?
Since there is no state legislative prohibition of
strikes, there are no statutory penalties for striking.

The

enforcement mechanism that has been available is the strike
injunction.

In 1972 I conducted a study of several so-called

"illegal" strikes to determine the effect that the law had on
the conduct of those strikes.

At that time I concluded, and I

quote:
"Public employee strikes are a fact of life in
California.

The law declaring them illegal does

not prevent their occurrence not even halt those
that occur."
I found that this was true because the enforcement
mechanism, the injunction, was in the hands of the employer which
might or might not decide to invoke it.

Those that did decide to

get an injunction found that it was generally ineffective 1n
halting a strike, and that it was difficult and costly to enforce
an injunction through contempt of court proceedings.
In the subsequent years
this conclusion.

I have found no reason to change

Some employers still seek injunctions, and some

attempt to enforce the orders by seeking court penalties against
unions and strikers, but generally with little success.

Even

those that initiate legal action may drop it as part of the negotiated settlement of the strike.

Courts still will, for the most

part, grant injunctions, alt
the ground that the empl

r

and the strikers will
For school empl
changed since the Supreme
Teachers Association case.
seeking to halt a school str

•

PERB since the Educational

1

exclusive initial jurisdiction t
an unfair practice.

Then

is an unfair practice.

e

If

unfair labor practice, then
whether or not a court

un t

of the act.

Only then can a s

injunction.

At that point,

t

problems that other publ
Many employers

me

nism is simply too ineffect
government employers have

c

legal deterrents to strikes, s
Act, local employers have

0

relations systems.
For example,

rec

cities have adopted ordinance
be fired and not rehired at al
with loss of accrued benefits
merely invoke a civil service

s

- 12 certain number of days is deemed to have quit his job and, accordingly, terminate strikers for be

AWOL.

(That option has already

become more visible with the air traffic controllers strike, I might
add)
Some local employers have revoked recognition of the
striking union, either because the local employee relations ordinance calls for that as a strike sanction or merely because the
employer determines that the union no longer represents a majority
of the employees since the newly hired employees do not belong to
the union.

A test case on that issue, IBEW vs. Gridley, is now

before the State Supreme Court.
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

On that point, how is it possible to

say that an employee no longer belongs to the union when he has
paid his current dues?
MISS BOGUE:

No, it's not a question of that.

If the

strikers have been replaced by new employees who actually do not
belong to the union, then they can argue that this employee
organization no longer represents a majority of the employees
within that bargaining unit or that are employed by that employer
and, therefore, they are under no obligation to recognize that
union as a majority representat
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

e of the employees.

Through the strike they have decerti-

fied themselves?
MISS BOGUE:
asserted.

In effect, that's what some employers have

Or others have a provision

their own rules and

regulations governing employee relations that declares that once
a union strikes, it has lost its right to be certified.

There

are different ways of going ab
I think its only happened
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:
tarily continue to contr
MISS BOGUE:

Then

certified again and then
the union does, in fact, sti 1
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

t

members of that organization
MISS BOGUE:

They can

them being members, it's just
tinue to recognize the un
over the strike issues.

If t

no longer represent these
it has no obligation to barga
Issues that are in dispute
out there representing its

1

Another alternative
union and/or employees.
I

1

Sever

only one has reached a fin
Local 660 has a damage j

f

J

ent

Angeles County Sanitation Distr
dollars, plus interest.

That

eventually reach the Supreme C

e
t.

right to strike for local gove
whether the union can lawfull
added expenses incurred because of

s

- 14 Other states -- and I will not get into the variety of
legislation that they have -- but o

states have tried different

statutory penalties, such as f

st the striking employees

es

or against the unions, or dock

es 2 days pay for each

day they're out on strike.
Such alternatives have had little or no use in California.
Most public employers who experience a strike see it as a problem
to be resolved at the bargaining table with a representative of
its employees.

Many that I have interviewed over the years find

that legal sanctions, even when available, do not deter strikes,
and more importantly, do not reso
has brought on the strike.

e the underlying dispute that

I have been told that a resort to legal

sanctions can actually prolong a str

because it distracts the

parties from the immediate problem of bargaining on the merits of
the impasse, and can create addition
way of settlement

oblems that stand in the

such as, a demand for amnesty for strikers.

Although a strike injunction may weaken the resolve of strikers
to stay out, and that, of course, has happened.

It can also have

the opposite effect of strengthening the individual's resolve
under the threat of martyrdom.
I have no conclusions to draw or to offer to the
Committee, but merely these remarks as an overview of the public
employee strikes in California ga
menting and observing them.

ed from several years of docu-

And I thank you for the opportunity

to speak to you today.
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:
your coming to testify.

Miss Bogue, we certainly appreciate

Mr. Bald has a question for you.

Any

15
members of the Committee can ask
desire.

Mr. Bald.
CONSULTANT, JIM BALD:

since the PERB has been given orig
school strikes, have you noted
length or complexion of the schoo

t

have had any impact?

•

MISS BOGUE:

Since

s

RB

diction over strikes, actually t
of strikes.

But there's been a

0

instance, so far this year there
pared to 76 in 1979.

So there has

so prevalent statewide that it's not
MR. BALD:

In talking

o

the field these last couple of year
you noted any or heard of any

s

that decision might do for stri
Acts?

Is there any speculation

t e

t

PERB's original jurisdiction over st

•

as well?
MISS BOGUE:

I would s

court found for granting PERB

itia

would probably pertain to the ot

r

was based on the principle that

RB

l

over unfair practice charges,
be given the opportunity to determ
be an unfair practice.

And then, if

e

then it can go ahead with
under the act.

If

on it deems as appropriate

ev

's not

are left to their own

i

t
e

e, then the parties
ts.

In directly ans-

wering your question, I

ation about that

one way or the other, but I

enera ly assumed that the

same reasoning would perta
MR. BALD:

Thank

e s

that I find your publication
MISS BOGUE:

ve

Well, t

CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

valuable.

much.
stion, Miss Bogue.

Mr.

CONSULTANT, DAVE

sa

a

to effectively legislate

just in passing

s

to specifically authorize enti

t

that the only way
public sector is

the private sector to bring

legal action against the strik

any damages that

occurred as a result of the str

have any thought

relative to that philosophy?
MISS BOGUE:
received services?

As to

public who has not

t

An ind

a

r that would be an

effective mechanism?
MR. COX:

Right.

MISS BOGUE:

Well, I

would say that it would be
it would be effective.

1

I th

done yet, so I
e

as to whether or not
so many variables that

t

go into why any particular gr

es strike at any par-

ticular time that would be ano
occurrence, but I have no

e

whether or not that would be an

might affect the
0

cated guess as to
deterrent or not.

ry

I

-

CHAIRMAN TUCKER:
CONSULTANT, ROBB

s

you found that there has b
activity due to the pass

e

e

to say, throughout the Unit
MISS BOGUE:

I wish

Through a quick glance of t e

•

mine that.

I think you can

provision and note that even
still having some strikes.

So

1

But I did not have available
an anti-strike provision bee
off of strikes.
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM:

t

of penalties do they have?
MISS BOGUE:

In

vision for docking employees

l

instead of just losing that
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM:
MISS BOGUE:

Which j

you're subject to being term
there have been some local

s

l

that requires that employees
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM:
or are they granted ....
MISS BOGUE:

It has n

one instance in San Diego, I b

?

- 18 -

maybe, where employees, there was

a provision on the books

and there was a strike and they at
employees because there were te

ted to terminate the
laws in the procedure

and they got hung up on the

hadn't been handled

right and the terminations were
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM:

Do

gest that if the Legis-

lature would enact no-strike legislation that they recommend
some type of penalty or enforcement policy to go along with
that statute?
MISS BOGUE:
or the other.

I would not make a recommendation one way

I think that all I can do is indicate that there
they are used in some

are those alternatives available
places.

But I have no recommen

tion to make one way or the

other.
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

Thank

Reginald Alleyne has arrived.
California, Los Angeles.

Professor

you, we're glad you got out of Los
PROFESSOR REGINALD
morning and thank you very much for
appeared before this Committee it
public experiences.

very much.

Well, Professor

1 of Law, University of
leyne we were waiting for
eles.
Well, I'm glad, too.
iting me.

Good

The last time I

s one of my more enjoyable

I found the Committee to be expert on the

questions asked, very challenging and it was just a great overall
experience.
once more.

So I was delighted to get the invitation to appear
In fact, the plane that

the pilot said, took a route over t

was on, because of the wind
City of San Francisco and

then turned back and made a Northward approach on the runway and

we passed right over this hotel

if I

I would have jumped out of

pl

had a parachute,

to get

re on time, but

I didn't have a parachute.
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

r your remarks and we

agree when you said that we wer

11 informed Committee, it

is because we have such people as

Miss Bogue and the

rest of the professionals who are go

to testify this morning.

Thank you, sir.
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE:

ite welcome.

re

one misgiving about accepting

invitation of the Committee

and that's because it invo

a plane ride and, although I

enjoy flying ordinarily, I persona

not believe that flying

is as safe as it used to be before

,000 air traffic controller's

went on strike and were fired as a result.
National Transportation Safe

I have only

B

saying that flying is safe rig

And although the

has issued a report
now with the reduced level of

flights, they qualify that find

strongly suggesting

in fact, indicating that things are very tense and as the
weather gets bad and there is more stra

on the current crew

of controller's, that we m

wel

erience a disaster as

the effort to rebuild the a

traf

control system does not

succeed.
I opened my remarks

that because I believe

s

that the manner in which President Re
"PATCO" strike and the adverse eff
risks to those of us who travel

an has treated the

ts on the economy and the
a r have a direct bearing

on the subject you've asked me to speak on this morning.

The

0

subject of this hearing is the 1

~

al status of public employee

strikes in California.
What I would first like to
decisions, mainly one, the one

1s address the court

cis

which in my mind is the

key decision in attempting to as erta

what the legal status of

strikes for public employees is in California and then to discuss
the President's treatment of the PATCO strike and tie those two
topics together and attempt to po

t out to the Committee just

how they are related and why,

view as I indicated to the

Committee during my last appearanc , any attempts by a State
Legislature or a City Council or Bo

s of Supervisors or the

Federal Government, for that matter, to make public employee
strikes illegal will continue to be counter productive.

That's

a hard argument to sell to the general public because the public
is of a view and understandab
evil, you make it illegal.

so, t

The pub

t

if there is a social

c does not understand the

view that even though a strike is a very undesirable event and
that we might call it a necessary evil
that the way to keep strikes to a m

~~

or evil nonetheless --

1mum, not only in a private

sector but in the public sector is to make strikes lawful so that
both parties at the bargaining t

le have a clear understanding

that if the bargaining process does not result in a collective
bargaining agreement being reached t
be a strike and if there is a stri
of the two parties would be ser

t there very likely would
that both parties or one

s

injured as a result and

with that knowledge, as we see from the experience in the private
sector both parties knowing of those dire consequences -- that if

- 21 a strike is going to take place both parties will work very hard
to avoid a strike.

In addition, we know from the statistics that

in 99 and 9 tenths of the cases in the private sector they succeed
and they reach an agreement.

This has been the underlying objec-

tive of the National Labor Relations Act ever since 1935 and we
have to wonder when the lesson of that statute will be brought
home to the public sector.
Let me turn to what I suggest is the leading California
Supreme Court decision on the subject of public employee strikes
and more particularly on the subject of where we are in terms of
the legal status of public employee strikes in California.

It's

not easy to determine what that status is in California because
unlike other states we do not have, as all of you know, a clear
legislative mandate that public employee strikes are unlawful
or that they are, for that matter lawful.

And what we have is

a series of court decisions on the subject, a sort of common
law on strikes.

And since the court is fashioning these deci-

sions and this common law on a case-by-case basis, it's a little
hard to generalize and say exactly what the level status is.

•

But if I had to turn to one case I would look at San
Diego Teachers vs. the Superior Court which was decided by the
California Supreme Court in April of 1979 and is reported that
24 California Reporter third at page 1 and also at 154 California
Reporter at page 893.

I can summarize the holding in that case

before briefly describing the facts which led to that case
reaching the California Supreme Court.

The facts are very

simple -- there was a strike by school teachers in San Diego.

- 22 Those teachers were represented by the San Diego Teachers Association.

Both during and before the strike unfair practice

charges were filed with the Public Employment Relations Board.
The Teachers Association accused the school district of a refusal to bargain and the school district accused the teachers
of refusing to bargain in that they had taken part in a strike.
While the strike was at the threatened strike stage, the school
districts sought an injunction from a Superior Court Judge.

He

granted the injunction, given the fact that the leader of the
San Diego Teachers Association had indicated that there would
be a strike, and he was right.

Subsequently, there was a strike

in the face of the injunction so that given the normal reaction
of judges when they issue injunctions, an individual's disobeyed
them, the Superior Court judge, Judge Levette, issued a contempt
citation against the leader of the San Diego Teachers Association.
He was found guilty of contempt of court, fined and given a jail
sentence.

He never served that sentence because the union, of

course, appealed his contempt conviction to the California
Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court, in a split decision,
held that the contempt citation was improperly issued.

That

before seeking an injunction the school district (San Diego
School District) should have been obligated to go to the Public
Employment Relations Board and to ask of the Board to find an
unfair practice on the part of the union (Teachers Association)
and to find further that as a result of the unfair practice of
refusing to bargain and going on strike without exhausting the

- 23 -

impasse procedures available under the Educational Employment
Relations Act, that the General Counsel of the PERB should have
made a recommendation to PERB and PERB should have decided
whether or not that unfair practice should be cured by -- among
other things -- PERB seeking an injunction.

In short, the

court held that the contempt conviction was invalid because
instead of going to the PERB, the school district went straight
to the Superior Court.
Now the interesting thing about San Diego Teachers
Association vs. Superior Court is that the California Supreme
Court said in that case that, and I quote,
''It is unnecessary here to resolve the question of
the legality of public employee strikes if the injunction remedies were improper because of the
districts failure to resolve its administrative
remedies under the EERA."
In other words, by going to the Public Employment
Relations Board and asking the Board to seek an injunction.
Well, having found that the school district should have exhausted
its administrative remedies before the Public Employment Relations
Board, the court had to stand by its statement that it was
unnecessary to resolve the question of the legality of public
employee strikes.

And yet, in my view, it was impossible to reach

the holding that the Supreme Court did on the question of whether
the contempt order by the judge was a valid one.

Without deciding,

in part, the question of whether or not public employee strikes -at least some of them, in California, might be lawful.
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Let me explain briefly why I see that dilemma in the
opinion of the court.

The court concludes, and again I quote

from the opinion,
"It does not follow from the dis

tion attendant on

a teacher's strike that immediate injunctive relief
and subsequent punishment for contempt are typically
the most effective means of minimizing the number of
teaching days lost from work stoppages.

As observed

in City and County of San Francisco vs. Cooper, the
question of appropriate sanctions for illegal strike
activity is complex, harsh, automatic sanctions, often
do not prevent strikes and are counter-productive."
That is at page 11 of the court's opinion.
And I'm following up on that important statement.
page 13 the court said,
"The mission of PERB is to foster a constructive employment relations.

That mission, surely, includes

the long-range minimization of work stoppages.
"PERB may conclude, in a particular case, that a
restraining order or an injunction would not hasten
the end of a strike (as perhaps neither did here)
and on the contrary, would impair the success of
the statutory mandated negotiations between union
and employer.

A court enjoining a strike on the

basis of a rule that public employee strikes are
illegal and harm resulting from the withholding
of teachers services cannot with expertise tailor

At
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its remedy to implement the broader objectives
entrusted to PERB."
Now, as I read those two portions of a courts opinion,
court is say
strike should be

that in some circumstances a public employee
oined and in other circumstances a public em-

ployee strike should not be enjoined and it is up to the Public
Employment Relations Board, on a case-by-case basis, to make a
determ

of

circumstances might g

rise to PERB not

seeking an injunction against a strike and letting that strike run
its course.

Unfortunately, in the typical way of courts, the de-

cision does not say what the circumstances are under which PERB
should seek the injunction to stop the strike and does not say
under what circumstances PERB should not seek an injunction and
what circumstances it should stop the strike by seeking an injunction in the courts.

That's left open to future cases.

not terribly important.

But that's

What is important, and it bears repeating,

is that from these two statements, the court has left open the door
of the Public Employment Relations Board to find that in a particular case the Board should not try to stop a strike by seeking an

•

injunction.

And if the courts are saying that in some instances no

injunction should be sought to stop a strike, the courts, the
California Supreme Court is necessarily holding that in some circumstances a strike is a valid and lawful strike.

And the underlying

premise that I read in these two portions of the opinion which I
read to you is that it's simply futile, in some cases, counterproductive in others, to seek an injunction which has the effect
of stopping a strike -- or attempts to stop a strike.
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Now the court didn't say that, but I'm of the opinion as
recognizing two things which I think are important and tend to be
lost on the public.

One is that there is something about the tend-

ency of individuals to withhold their services from employers which
makes it very much akin to the old prohibition laws.
were simply incapable of enforcing.

Which the laws

Members of the California

Supreme Court, in my view, recognized that many injunctions issued
by Superior Courts will simply not be obeyed.

That the individual

who is cited for contempt, who is jailed, as a result, and we have
evidence and experience along these lines in other jurisdictions,
will simply be looked upon as martyrs for a cause.

The jail time

will be served, the fine will be paid and the union will continue
to strike in the face of the injunction.
Judges do not like to give the appearance that they are
impotent and that their orders can be slighted.

And I think that's

one of the underlying reasons for the courts pronouncement.

That

in some cases it may be to the best interest of all that the strike
not be enjoined.
I think, implicit in the decision 1s the courts recognition that even if an injunction is obeyed in some instances,
there will be more instances in which it will not be obeyed, but
it is a punishment attempted to be meted out by an employer increases the threat of a general strike.

That is a strike by other

employees in support of the original strikers.

And in opposition

to punishment meted out to the original strikers could be a real
eventuality.

That is how I view the decision 1n the San Diego

Teachers Association vs. Superior Court.
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Implementing that decision, just to touch briefly upon
one PERB decision, the Modesto School District Case, PERB refused
to seek an injunction even though the impasse procedures of the
ational Employment Relations Act

been exhausted there was

one dissenting decision in the case, then board member Gonzales
said that the

was legislatively authorizing strikes.

that was a decidedly incorrect view.
I

I think

What the PERB did in the

Modesto case was to implement the langu

e that they found and

interpret it accurately, in my view, in San Diego Teachers Association vs. Superior Court authorizing the PERB not to seek an
injunction in particular cases when in the view of the PERB it
would be counter-productive to do so.
I would like to turn now to the administrations handling
of the PATCO strike and use that as an illustration of what the
California Supreme Court probably had in mind when it recognized
that it would not be in the best interest of the California
public to say, by way of judge made common law (as some lower
courts have done in California) that all public employee strikes
are illegal under California law.

It's true that President

Reagan may have won a victory over PATCO, but the question
remains whether the price of victory over the long term will
prove to be too high.

When close to 11,000 traffic controller's

walked off their job, they did not expect to be decertified,
they did not expect to be fired, I'm sure they believed that
the administration would not run the risk of taking a potentially
crippling strike.

PATCO, however, miscalculated its strength

and the administrations resolve and now with the recent
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decertification effort, its status as an entity with which the
administration must bargain is very much in doubt.
Even if the administration had not completely succeeded
in resisting PATCO's bargaining demands it's

irly clear to me

and I think to any observer of the collective barga

ing scene,

that the administration would not have given up anything close to
the five hundred million dollars that PATCO sought and that the
public viewed as exorbitant.

Those of us, including the members

of your committee who are familiar with the give-and-take of
collective bargaining, know that the mere fact that PATCO opened
negotiations with a five hundred million dollar demand probably
meant PATCO never expected to walk off with that much of a gain.
What is important here and what ties in with San Diego
Teachers Association vs. Superior Court, decided by the California
Supreme Court is that at the core of the administrations unwillingness to bargain with PATCO during the strike.

Are the federal

statutes making public employee strikes by federal employees unlawful?

It's the illegality of federal employee strikes that

permitted President Reagan to take the position that he would not
bargain with a union engaged in an illegal strike.
Now we ought to consider the effect of the position of
the administration being allowed to take the position that it
would not bargain with a union that is on strike.

To illustrate

the point, assume hypothetically that at the time of the PATCO
strike air traffic controller's had been employed by a private
sector employer.

In that event, the controller's and their

employer would have been covered by the National Labor Relations

-

Act. The 1935 statute authoriz
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collective bargaining for

ivate sector employees and permitting str
sector empl

es.

NRLA to me
breaking o
un

The court
at an empl

negotiations

is on str

in

rt

have consistently inte

o

reted

commits an unfair practice
th the union solely because the
its bargain

the simple expedient behind that idea is the
parties

s by private

otiate while the str

demands.

And

a of forcing

is in progress for

the purpose of furthering the chances of a settlement of the
underlying dispute, contract dispute which led to the strike.
To me

's a very sensible primise.

The National Labor

Relations Act also operates on the premise that the mere
possibility of a strike, as I indicated earlier, with its
potential for economic hardship for both parties will encourage
the kinds of serious bargaining that will prevent a strike
from taking place.
The serious question for the Committee, and all members of the California public, is whether or not these policies,
hard as they might be to understand by the lay public, which
are designed by the federal government to decrease private
sector strike possibilities and to shorten the duration of
strikes when strikes take place, ought to apply as sensibly
to the federal and local governments in the
employers.

capacities as

And it may well prove to be the incapability of

those policies to the federal government itself as an employer
that could make the administrations short term victory over
PATCO one of mere appearance over the short term.

-
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The administration has already all but openly admitted
that the so-called rebuild

of the traffic control system is

just barely keeping pace wi

the demands being made on the

system.

One might po

to the President s apparent success

of handling the PATCO strike, there's some evidence that public
employers across the nation will now take their cue from the
President, stiffen the
strike.

resolve in the face of a threatened

But that view fails to take into account how

the President was, in my view.

tunate

From his perspective, having

as an adversary in the PATCO strike an organization not close
to being fully supported by other unions because PATCO's
history of ignoring other union picket lines and somewhat
ironically, because of PATCO's support of President Reagan
during his campaign for the Presidency, the administration
would have been forced to bargain its way to a solution of the
PATCO dispute if key unions like the International Association
of Machinists

which represents large numbers of airline

mechanics -- and the Airline Pilots Association had refused to
cross PATCO picket lines.

Now not every public employer --

including public employers in California -- would be so fortunate to have that kind of a union as an adversary, across the
bargaining table.

But neither is success in confronting a

union during a strike, some

ing unknown in private sector

labor management relations.

And this is a lesson that's sometimes

forgotten.

One of the prevailing myths about strikes is that all

of them are bound to succeed in defeating an employers bargaining
objectives.

We see that in the dissenting opinion in San Diego

- 31 Teachers Association vs. Superior Court where Justice Richardson
quotes Judge Coflin of one of the Appellate Courts in an earlier
ca e,

lding

effect, that every t

ere's a strike that a

lie employer is going to have to g

But not anything

close to all private sector strikes are successful in the sense
t

t

t

union wal

away with more substant

employers last pre-strike offer.
f t

str

Indeed,

s success and the hardsh

1 gains than the

it's the uncertainty

of c

ckless paydays

during the strike that so effectively restrain the inclination
to strike, so much so, that in my view of the laws banning
public employee strikes are almost irrelevant as supplementary
deterrents.

All we get from them -- the laws banning strikes --

is the example we have seen in the PATCO strike, of the public
employer being able to take the position that I will not
negotiate while the strike is in progress.

And all that

does is prolong the strike beyond the duration that would
have taken place had the employer been compelled to negotiate.
I have no doubt that if the administration had been operating
under the same kind of National Labor Relations Act requiring
bargaining in the face of a strike, that this dispute -- the
PATCO dispute -- would have been ended by now.
ended with a victory for the administration.

It might have
But the Traffic

Controller's would have been working now, defeated at the
bargaining table and we would not be seeing the potential
for chaos in the year that we see now, the long delays in
flights getting away and the great inconvenience to the
public.

- 32 The private sector employer, it should not be forgotten,
is not entirely unprotected by the law in the face of an economic
strike.

A private sector employer may replace strikers and operate

the struck establishment with the replacements during the duration
of a strike.

There's no obligation to fire the replacement

employees when the strike ends and the strikers seek to r
their jobs.

a

If vacancies exist after the strike ends, the private

sector employer in order to avoid violating the National Labor
Relations Act, need only refrain from refusing to hire former
strikers because they struck.
counter to the strike.

Now that's a very effective

And it was approved by the United States

Supreme Court in a 1938 case NLRB vs. McKay Radio and Telegraph Co.
If similar ground rules had been applicable to federal
sector employees at the time of the PATCO strike, the administration could have replaced striking air traffic controllers during
the strike, and rehired them after the strikes end to fill the
many vacancies for experienced controllers that will now not be
filled for at least another twenty months while the air traffic
control system is being rebuilt by amateurs and by beginners.

I

might also add that the fallacy of that whole situation is illustrated quite neatly and graphically in my view, by the trial
balloon announcement that was floated by the President a few days
ago that he may rehire traffic controllers, but not as traffic
controllers; they will deliver mail, they will fill as clerks in
the Internal Revenue Service, on the ground, out of the towers
while mere chaos takes place overhead.

That is a patently

ridiculous spectacle, and I hope for the sake of our government
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and the possible embarrassment of our government in the eyes of
other nations, if not internally and domestically, that that
scene never takes place
th the

t

United States.

In conjunction

ship of checkless paydays during the strike and the

always real possibility of ending a long strike with little more
gain

the employer's last pre-strike offer, the ability to

replace strikers and offer the replacements permanent jobs con
tributes to the low strike rate of public,
in the United States.

rivate sector employees

I might add, in conclusion, that it might

be argued that public employees perform a unique service and may
not be as replaceable as private sector employees, I'm sure you'll
hear that today.
wide.

But that generalization sweeps too far and too

It's a rehashing of the old and, in my view, irrational

notion that all public employees, including all air traffic controllers, are more essential than all private sector employees,
including all commercial airline pilots.

Now the fallacy there

is underscored by the administration's insistence that air traffic
controllers are replaceable; thus, even if the administration is
successful in rebuilding the air traffic control system slowly
but without major incident, one of the prevailing assumptions
about public employee strikes, irreplaceability of public employees,
will have been undercut.

The question will then be whether the

risk of disaster over the long-term of almost two years had been
worth taking.

On the other hand, the strains placed on the air

traffic system by the need to rebuild it becomes a contributing
cause of a serious disaster, the wisdom of the laws permitting
the refusal to negotiate while a strike takes place will

-
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graphically have become open to serious question.

My final sen-

tence is this -- that I believe those are some of the unde

ying

concerns, or were some of the underlying concerns, of the
California Supreme Court in its decision in San Diego Teachers
vs. Supreme Court.
to be here.

Thank you very much, again, for the opportuni

If this committee has questions, I'll answer them.

CHAIRMAN TUCKER:
MR. BALD:

Go right ahead, Mr. Bald.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to pursue

two lines of questioning with you, Professor.

First, on the sub-

ject of the Supreme Court's San Diego decision, and I concur
and agree with you that it certainly is a key position.
The question of the legality or illegality of public employees'
strikes here in California has been with us actively now for 8 or
10 years, certainly since the passage of the Rodda Act; and up
until the San Diego decision, it was accepted generally that public employee strikes were illegal because of the lower court
decision.

Do you -- and the Legislature in all that time declined

to come down on one side or the other; it left an open question.
Do you perceive the court's decision in the San Diego case as
finally saying, "If the Legislature is not going to make a decision,
we are going to move in other directions.

And we are going to say

that in certain instances, public employee strikes may well be legal"?
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE:

I think it's not a question of moving

ln that direction, but you've put it quite succinctly.

I think that

is precisely where we are now with the San Diego Teachers Association.
MR. BALD:

Do you think that is a result of the Legislators'

indecision in this area?
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PROFESSOR ALLEYNE:

Well, I think it is a consequence of

there being no legislation on the subject for public employees in
California.

Yes, you might say that we might look at it in terms

of the court filling a void.

On the ot

hand, I'm not sure how

the members of the California Supreme Court feel about the wisdom
of legislation being enacted.

I know that's none of their business,

and that's entirely up to the Legislature, but they may agree with

•

me that the issue is so complicated and so laden with emotion that
the best way to handle it is on a case-by-case development of the
common law.

I would also add that one thing that to me explains

why the Legislature has done virtually nothing in this area since
public employees are authorized to engage in public bargaining
while the court is moving ahead is explained on the basis of the
differing nature of the Legislature and the judiciary.

You, as

Legislators, are more -- by nature -- sensitive to the will of
the electorate than the court must be.

As I indicated in my

opening remarks, it would be very hard to explain if I were a
legislator to my constituents, why you legalize something in
order to keep it from happening as often as it would happen
otherwise.

It's a very hard argument to sell; and I am quite

sure that there are people who represent a district where it
would be impossible to sell it and where, if you took that view,
you'd be defeated.

The court, on the other hand, is -- as all

of us know -- more insulated from those kinds of political
pressures since its operating here on a case-by-case basis.
Its judgments are not nearly as dramatic as would be the action
of the Legislature in the naked, bald statement of a statute that
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would be debated for several weeks, days, be
and, so I conclude that it is eas

were enacted;

r for t

because it is easier for the court and

court to
t

i

to operate the way it has than it

court
Legislature to

attempt to fill the void of becoming embroil

public debate

of whether legislation should ban strikes or

ther legislation

should make public employee strikes lawful.
MR. BALD:

Thank you.

I t

it -- let me see if I can

restate your position -- there is no instance

which you would

see public employees' strikes as being illegal.

It is your posi-

tion that public employee strikes are and ought to be legal and
permissible.

Have I stated your case?

PROFESSOR ALLEYNE:
~s

That is -- we cannot say that that

yet the view of the California Supreme Court.

me my personal view?

But you're asking

My personal view is that public employees'

strikes across the board should be lawful.
MR. BALD:

And you say, as your view, there is no

difference between employer-employee relat
sector and the public sector, or at least
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE:
MR. BALD:

s

the private

ere shouldn't be?

That is my view.

You can think, then, of no

stance in which a public employee stri

is

thetical Inate ought to be

stopped by court order or force of arms, if necessary?
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE:
MR BALD:

A violent str

?

Yes.

Well, a violent strike would be impermissible.

PROFESSOR ALLEYNE:

Would be impermissible?

If you're

asking whether any peaceful strike, economic strike in support of
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a case while I was a visiting professor back East for a year in
the Medford, Massachusetts School District in which, at one point,
I went back to the school district, and I said to them, "I can't
get the teachers' association to move one iota from its demands."
And every member of the school board virtually stood up and cheered.
They said, "Great!

Now there will be a strike, and we have the

replacements available, substitute teachers, to replace those
strikers; and we will call up those replacements; bring them in,
and simply go on running the schools with the substitute teachers."
They said to me, "There is no way these people can win a strike.
We will get rid of them.
they meant it.

We're glad they're going on strike," and

They really meant it, first of all.

back to the union and I said they were caucusing.

And I went
It was not one

of those situations where the parties could confront each other,
that happens sometimes like some bad marriages.

I went back to

the union, and I said, "Look!" and reiterated what the school
board had said.

And so, they were so concerned that they took a

recess for 3 weeks, it was close to Christmas

we came back in

January, and the union said that it would not go on strike; that
it was going to accept the employer's last offer.

That happens

as frequently, more frequently, than your very dramatic, hypothetical school board closing its schools on an open-ended basis
because it doesn't have the money to meet a union's demands.

I

think implicit in your question is the underlying notion which I
addressed in my opening remarks, that anytime a union goes on
strike, the union is going to win; when the truth of the matter
is that, even in the private sector where it's easier for a union

to
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there is an over reaction by management; none of us likes to give
up prerogatives that allowed me to operate unilaterally for all of
the time I had been

iness.

But study after s

shows quite

clearly that the greater the experience, the longer the term that
is, of operating under a collective bargaining statute, the less
concern there is about the giving up of managerial prerogatives.
I guess it's like anything else, you want to cling to it when you
have it, but once you give it up, you get used to having given it
up.

So, yes, my answer to your question would be yes.

I have

already noted a decrease in that attitude as compared with, say,
early 1976 when the Rodda Act was enacted and during its first
year of operation.

I think school districts are becoming more

and more accustomed to not dealing unilaterally with employees,
and they are becoming more accustomed to sharing with employees
through their employee organizations the decisions on what the
work environment will be.
MR. BALD:

That's what collective bargaining is.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

Well, Professor Alleyne, I can't be

partial in this hearing, of course, as the Chairman, but I share
some of your views so far as those controllers.
Angeles to Sacramento every week for 2 months.

I drove from Los
After that, I

decided I'd learn to pray a lot, and I do; I start my pr

rs the

moment that engine starts up on the plane, and I pray t

it is

going to land.

You have a question?

MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM:

Okay, Mrs. Coaxum.

Yes, could you address any differences

which may exist between strikes by safety employees compared to strikes
by other employees?

Are there any major differences?

- 41 PROFESSOR ALLEYNE:

Strikes by public safety employees

as compared with ....
MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM:

Say, clerical.

PROFESSOR ALLEYNE:

Clerical and all other public em-

ployees whose jobs might be viewed as less essential than the jobs
of the public safety people.

I would not treat them any differently,

as I indicated in responding to Mr. Bald's question.

•

I think the

legalizing of public employee strikes should be across the board .
Obviously, in the case of police and fire, we run greater risks if
they strike; and yet, I'm not sure that I'm aware of very many
experiences in which -- and there haven't been very many, of course
of police strikes and fire strikes where we had the kinds of disaster
that one might think would take place if police officers and fire
personnel should strike.

The reason why we haven't had those

disasters in the few instances in which public safety people have
struck is that they, too, are capable of being replaced.

I would

feel just as safe, if not more safe, with the National Guard
patrolling my neighborhood with howitzers and bazookas as I would
with the sheriff's car driving by once every 3 days, two policemen
with nightsticks and 45-automatics.
Again, President Reagan's notion all along is, "I can
replace air traffic controllers.

It's going to take me 2 years

almost, but I'm going to eventually replace them."
fire are no exception.

There is also this point.

Police and
I think that

we find that police and fire personnel are fully aware of the
differences between their responsibilities to the public and
those of -- to cite your example -- clerical employees.

Maybe
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clerical employees is a

example to use

this room this morning.

For that reason, they are less reluctant to go out on strike than
are other empl

e s

s

I

terms of the effect of

not treat t

di

rent

law upon them.

MRS. LEWIS-COAXUM:
striking, such as bind

Do you know of any

ternat

s to

arbitration; do you feel that is a good

alternative?
PROPES

I think b

worst of all worlds.

ing arbitr

ion is

It's even opposed now by responsible employ-

ers, it's opposed by California -- by the National League of Cities
and its local affiliates here in California.
Mayor Bradley.

It is

by

s

Ideally, binding arbitration is suppos

to serve
para-

as a substitute for the strike, but what we see now is

to

doxical situation of public employers; A) opposing the r
strike; and B) oppos

binding arbitration; and I don't know

where that leaves you.

You just can't have it both

If you

want a good indication of the experience with binding a

itration,

you look at Australia where there is binding arbitration

the

private sector and where the strike rate far exceeds t

strike

rate in the private sector in the United States where we
on this desirable,
just don't force
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situation there is chaotic.''

And I know what he meant.

That's

what happens when you rely upon their party neutrals, and when
you rely upon individuals not bargaining as seriously as they
might otherwise bargain if it were not for the presence of
this crutch, of slipping into this binding arbitration seemingly
easy way of resolving the dispute.

And then when the union

doesn't like what the binding arbitrator decides, what is to
prevent the union from striking because it objects to the
arbitrator's award?
just doesn't work.

I'm convinced that binding arbitration
It just doesn't work.

CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

I want to thank you very much,

Professor Alleyne.
PROFESSOR ALLEYNE:
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

Thank you very much.
I'd like to call Professor Charles

Craver, Martin Luther King, Jr., School of Law, University of
California at Davis.
PROFESSOR CHARLES CRAVER:

I should like to thank this

Committee for inviting me to appear here today.

I'm a firm

believer that it is important for those of us who are associated
with the University to participate beyond the walls of our ivory
tower, and it is nice to have the opportunity to express my views
here today.

I would like to say a few words at the outset about

the PATCO situation and then some concerns of a general nature
pertaining to public sector strikes.
I think, as my colleague Professor Alleyne so aptly
pointed out, with the PATCO situation, you had people on both
sides that grossly misconceived the situation.

I think it's very
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A few words about public sector strikes:

It is quite

clear today that it is permissible to prohibit public sector
strikes; the Supreme Court seemed to accept that position by
confirming a decision of the District Court in the District of
Columbia United Federation of Postal Clerks vs. Blount in 1971.
I do not propose to proselytize either in favor of or opposed to
public sector strikes.
I think it is crucial to have a clear definition of
what it is that is being proscribed.

Obviously, we envision a

concerted refusal to work at all, but often we have to cover such
things as slow-down.

What happens if people assiduously work

to rule, such as is happening in some areas of this country at
the present time when police officers write a ticket for every
conceivable violation, including -- in some cases

the City

Commissioner and the Mayor, would that constitute a work stoppage?
What happens if teachers refuse to participate in PTA meetings
that were scheduled in the evening?
What happens if teachers refuse to accept extra curricular assignments?

My wife is a school librarian, and on

several occasions they have actually put pressure on employees
to agree to participate in extra curricular activities where
the teacher did not wish to do so.

Would that constitute an

illegal work stoppage if strikes were prohibited?

No matter

what is done by the Legislature in this regard, I do think it
will be necessary for the courts to become involved.

They

obviously have the ultimate decision to interpret and apply the
law as was done in the San Diego Teachers case, the Supreme Court
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- 47 such services are provided by private sector employees, they are,
indeed, entitled to strike under the National Labor Relations Act.
I

that an argument can clearly be made if one is going to
h

it strikes at all that it is far more logical to do so with

respect to people who are performing "essential" services
however that is determined -- although I would not want to be the
person who would have to decide who was essential and who was not.
With respect to non-essential personnel in the public
sector, the evidence in many states of this country indicates
that the legality of strikes in that area is not necessarily going
to be devastating; states like Pennsylvania, Hawaii, Montana, and
others have legalized some strikes by non-essential personnel.
And as Professor Alleyne has pointed out, what often happens is
that where you know that the employees have the right to strike,
you have a substantial impetus to bargain in good faith; whereas,
when you are laboring under the misconception that they cannot
strike simply because it is illegal, even it is not necessarily
something that they will not engage in, often the employers do
not bargain in good faith.

I have seen public employers that

have said, "I explained our position to the workers, and we know
what's best for them because we know what the budgetary figures
are, and they should accept that."

It is a terribly paternalistic

view that is often very antagonistic to the employees.
I remember the situation that existed in Michigan now
about a decade ago, in fact a little more than that, when my wife
participated in a rather lengthy teachers' strike, and I can
remember a public meeting where the union officials and the school
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f

s were presenting their various positions to the
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have a

stoppage,

only way it
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s commenced on a Thursday and ran all evening into Friday,
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very early Saturday morning because the judge

tickets to the
't plan to miss it.
tl

for

football game that Saturday, and
And the parties settled, and they

more than the Treasurer said was in the budget,

paid it, and they had no difficulty doing so.

And so,

no wonder that teachers are suspicious when one side says
t

only knowledge available.
I do think that if the Legislature were to prohibit
, and if they were to determine that certain strikes would
able, it should provide definitive standards that would

t

court and the Public Employment Relations Board when it
es

ther it would or would not seek an injunction.
issue was raised earlier whether there can be

1 c

lective bargaining for public employees if they

not provided either with a strike right or a meaningful
ernative.

I think that if you tell employees that they have
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require t

employer or
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is has the benefit of at least forcing the parties to achieve
a reasonable f
arbitration.
leyne in

1 proposal -- at least it will be rejected in
And I should add, I do share the view of Professor

is regard, even though I am an arbitrator, I find

t vastly preferable to the public as well as the employer and
workers involved if the parties are able to resolve their own
disputes.

I am not politically accountable, number one, which

raises substantial questions.

I could come in knowing nothing

- so about the particular circumstances; and if they fail to educate
me fully, I could easily make a grievous error.
I had a case recently in the private sector where the
obvious solution was one the parties could work out themselves,
and I could not because I was given two alternatives, neither of
which was particularly appealing, and I must say -- unlike my
usual view -- I endeavored strenuously and I plan to continue to
do so until I have to make a final decision to coax the parties
back to their bargaining table, in effect, in an effort to achieve
what to them would be a vastly superior resolution to the one that
I would be forced to provide should I make the final determination.
Whenever I have been involved in public sector disputes, I do my
utmost to convince the parties, even though I have been appointed,
it ill behooves them to do nothing but prepare for the hearing
when they could continue bargaining and reach a solution which
both sides would be able to understand far more than I could.
The other types of binding arbitration in public sectors,
some arbitrators are allowed to make determination on an issue-byissue basis among the final proposals made by the parties themselves.
The third real option is one that makes me quite nervous, I must
say, and that's where the arbitrator has carte blanche authority
to determine for himself or herself what would be appropriate.
One of the issues that is most debated is that of the
ability of the employer to meet the financial obligation being
specified in the arbitral award, and in the State of Michigan for
a long time, that was not one of the stated criterion and there
were several arbitrators' decisions in the City of Detroit where
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r it is appropriate to

delegate that authority to a private individual to decide.

I am

a supporter of public sector arbitration, I have written in the

•

area and indicated that position, but I must say, that while I
do support that personally, I think it is entirely appropriate
to ask the question whether it would be preferable to have the
public suffer through what in some cases would be at most a short
work stoppage, then to have somebody come in and recreate, by
providing deferred compensation, for instance, in the forms of
generous retirement benefits that will become due in 20 or 30
years or to provide benefits that would necessitate immediate
tax increases or service curtailment where it would be better
if the politically accountable decision were made by those who
are elected by the public.
I would like to say a few words about the underlying
causes of public sector strikes because so often they are ignored.
It is assumed that it is the aboriginest worker who precipitates
work stoppages and it simply isn't true in all cases, but that
is, indeed, the cause of the strike.

Someone did raise the

question earlier about parentalism in the public sector.

I think

- 52 we see in the public sector today, the same phenomenon that
existed in the late 1930's in the private sector and into the
1940's.

There is substantial reluctance for people who have

authority to share that authority unnecessarily with other people.
If I am the manager and I own the company or at least manage the
company, I do not want my prerogratives infringed by what I perce
to be subordinate.

When one passes a collective bargaining statute,

that ipso facto makes the employees at least at the bargaining
table equal to the managers, and they are reluctant to accept
that and I know many employers both in the public sector and to
some degree in private sector who feel they know what is best for
the workers and it is heresy for the workers not to accept the
assumption.
In one of the greatest causes of public sector strikes,
is the employer naively assumes, as I mentioned at the outset,
that the employees owe their undivided loyalty to management and
to the government and to the public they serve, rather than to
their fellow employees in the bargaining unit and to their labor
organization.

In many cases, if they are forced to make a choice,

workers will select their fellow employees over the public, particularly if they feel that they are not being treated appropriately.
Another problem that often arises in the public sector,
that is not very prevalent in the private sector, is the situation
where designated bargaining representatives don't really possess
sufficient authority to resolve the matters, they will ultimately
have to be decided by the Legislative body, particularly with
respect to fiscal matters.

As a result, the labor union officials
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avor to achieve an end run by circumventing the designated
otiators and going directly to friendly Legislators.

In this

, because nothing undercuts a negotiator faster than
a superior make a decision behind his or her back that
t

are not apprised of.
Another problem that arises is the area of deferred
ensation.

I was reading the Atlantic article that has been

news so much lately and they were t

king with Mr. Stockman,

and they said that there is gonna be hell to pay in about 1985
or 1986.

In his response apparently was, that we aren't concerned

th 1985 or 1986, now we're only talking about the next several
ars.

It's easy to take that view, particularly when ones

elected for a term of years.

As a result, it is very easy to

placate employees by promising them, as some cities have done,
much to the chagrin of the current taxpaying public, promising in
munificient deferred compensation forms of early retirement.
And as a result, when those retirements which are not fully funded,
ecome due 20 or 30 years hence, that creates a tremendous crisis
because they either have to choose between bankruptcy or using
s that would be available for current services and current
loyment to pay people who are now working elsewhere and are
retired.
Many employers engage in hard bargaining tactics.

The

example Professor Alleyne gave this morning with respect to the
school board in Massachusetts, some of them really have that
mentality that this is a win/lose situation.

At the bargaining

le there really can't be a true winner and a true loser,
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because if one side truly loses, usually both sides lose, since
its a symbiotic relationship.

If the workers are replaced,

you will have a long period of training, as we see now, as
we see with respect to PATCO; you will have a work force that
is often very nervous about the fact that they know the circumstances under which they were hired.

They are concerned that

in the future if they are not satisfied with conditions they
too will be easily replaced, and old addage, that a happy worker
is a productive worker, holds true whether ones' in the private
sector or the public sector.

If a worker is paranoid about

his or her future employment, and if they feel that they have
to succumb to the dictates of their employer no matter how
fair or unfair, I think the public will have a very dissatisfied
experience for the work force.

It will be very interesting if

the PATCO situation continues to see what the situation is, not
only through this winter, as we have far greater problems with
weather; but, even into next summer with the peak travel, 1n
the summer time as well as next winter.

Because, if they are

not replaced, to the degree which I think the administration
still is deluding itself in thinking they will be replaced,
there is going to be a crisis, I think, in many of the towers
for people who are working long hours under trying circumstances.
Another problem that arises in the public sector, is
the failure of public managers in some cases to handle expeditiously employee grievances.

One of the greatest assets provided

by labor organizations in the collective bargaining process,
isn't necessary to the increase in benefits, financial in nature,
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And I must say, when I was

was
1

resolving
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the State of Florida,

the writing of rules and reg

ations for the

loyee Relations Commission in that state, I was happy
t

e State of Florida has

it

own public employee

elations statute, a provision requiring in all collective barga

ing agreements, that there be included a provision not only
grievance resolution, but for final and binding arbitration.

In this state there is an extreme reluctance of many employers
to agree to that.

We had a recent school board election, in my

town in Davis, and I was talking to a school board member
they thought it heresy that they would have to allow an
outsider to come in and decide whether they had the right to
discipline or whether they had the right not to evaluate a
r; or if th

had evaluated a teacher to have somebody

to review the evaluation procedure that had been followed.
And I should note, many employers sit there and say,
'I

't know why these workers are so hot headed."
is small grievance and 100 people walked out.

We had

I think that

familiar with labor relations should be aware of the
t that, where you have seemingly minor grievance, and
wor
t

rs have elected to go out on strike, it has to be the
of the iceberg, and the inquiries must be made to ascertain
is really troubling the worker.

Contrary to the impression
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of some people in the public, workers do not strike willingly.
It is a devastating decision, it is a demoralizing decision, one
is not going to be paid during that period.

We do have in general

such a strong embedded work ethic in our mind, but we don't like
to be out of work.

As a result, it is a very, very difficult

decision for people, particularly public sector employees, to
age in a work stoppage.

And I think so often when they see

somebody on strike, whether they are public teachers or safety
personnel or other people in the publics sphere, and they think
that they have made that decision lightly, my experience has
been just the opposite.

There are many instances, where perhaps

a strike would have even been appropriate, where the people
have elected not to engage in a work stoppage because they felt
that the conditions simply weren't as outrageous as they felt
necessary to precipitate as that extreme conduct.
If public sector strikes are to be unlawful, I think
the Legislature should make a definitive decision whether they
feel that this should be done legislatively instead of inferentially.

Whether the Public Employment Relations Board should

make the determinations as to which stoppages are to be prohibited
and which are to be accepted; whether they should provide
standards, whether if injunctions are to be sought they should
be available directly through courts rather than through the
Public Employment Relations Board initially.

A couple of con-

siderations, as I was sitting here listening to people debate
the necessity for injunctive relief, and a question was asked
whether any stoppage should be enjoined.

If one agrees that

- 57 some stoppages should be enjoined, it reminded me of the book
written, in the late 1920's and published, I believe in 1930,
by Felix Frankfurter, who became, of course, Justice Frankfurter.
Nathan Green called the labor injunction, which described in
rather graphic details, the tremendous abuses in the private
sector, which had been imposed upon private employees and labor
organizations by way of labor injunction.

And the same type of

abuse could easily occur in the public sector if judges who are
not sympathetic to employees were allowed to issue ex-party,
in some cases injunctive orders on a temporary basis and permanent
injunctive orders where the grounds were perhaps suspect.
If you resort first to the PERB, obviously there will
be some delay involved, and there will be an increased caseload
on the Public Employment Relations Board.

On the other hand,

if public employers are allowed to go directly into court,
there is a risk of inconsistent Judicial Rules, since they will
be resolved on a case-by-case basis in various courts; not only
in the various districts, but among the various judges in each
particular district.

One judge might issue an injunction in

a case where a fellow judge would not do so.

If they are to be

mitigating circumstances, which might provide a defense to an
otherwise unlawful work stoppage, it perhaps becomes even more
imperative to have the PERB initially make that determination,
so that we will have a uniform state policy by the board possessing the special expertise dealing with public sector labor matters.
The other point that I want to make, is that if we
decide that work stoppage should be illegal, we are going to have
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ace the problem of penalty.

Number 1:

clearly outlawing

lie sector strikes will not, in and of itself, preclude work
es by public employees,

it would be most naive to

that that's going to be the resu

The vast majority

f states in this country have prohibited strikes by public
1

es, and yet in every state that I am aware of, some work
ages have occurred.

In some cases, as we noted in the

1 presentation here today, hundreds of strikes have
occurred in many of those jurisdictions.
It is not simply a question of whether we are going to
successfully outlaw the strike, it is a question of what we will do,
if we prohibit them, to provide at least the facade of a penalty.
And I should point out, injunctive orders won't be successful,
because if people feel agrieved sufficiently, they will disobey
them.

If they are disobeyed, they can fine a labor organization,

if the fine becomes outrageous, the labor organization has the
right to go into bankruptcy.
11 go bankrupt.

So if worse comes to worse, they

The nicest thing the court can do, if it

wants to assure the re-election of the union official, is to use
jail as an alternative contempt penalty.

Nothing helps gain

re-election faster than sending the union official to jail who
becomes a martyr.

Needless to say, it is most difficult to

negotiate with that union official while he or she is incarcerated.

That was a problem a few years ago in New York, where

they had a sanitation strike and the president was in jail, and
finally the Mayor decided that it became necessary to negotiate
and someone said are we going to let the president out of jail,
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or are we going to go down and negotiate in the tombs.
fines against ind
s

Contempt

iduals, are normally not terribly successful,

ly because if some people feel they need to be, the people

are going to be judgment proof.

Most

lie employees, like

private sector employees, don't have huge sums in their bank
accounts, and if they are fined $1,000 a day, they rarely use
their Mastercard or Visa to pay it.
mentioned, has a f
strike.

New York State, as has been

e system; two days of pay for every day of a

Perhaps it has some deterrent effect, it has not been

significant; there have been several hundred strikes in the State
of New York by public employees.

If people are agrieved enough,

it is a small penalty to pay even 10 or 20 days worth of compensation to the long-run benefits.

And I should point out, what

I hoped would be obvious, some people will say, well the worker
only gained 20 cents per hour more, and over the next two year
contract, that's insignificant.
Two things have to be made clear:

1) they have enhanced

their credibility in future negotiations, which is crucial.

The

next several times they get to the bargaining table and the employer
assumes that there will be no work stoppage, it will reconsider that
particular position; 2) the other factor is, that if you get a 20
cent per hour wage now, it will be in the base of your pay for the
next number of years, so that you have another 30 years to work,
to the next 30 years you will have an increase base of 20 cents
per hour, and on that basis it does, indeed, add up.
The possible decertification of unions, as we see with
the PATCO situation, is not terribly efficacious.

If the
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controllers ever went back to work or if their substitutes decide
t they really do support Mr. Poli in his organization, the
rnment is going to have to openly sit down and negotiate
with them.
a

Perhaps they will c

e

ir name so that the

stration can save face, but the truth of the matter is
t
t

people really support a particular o

anization, and

right to negotiate through that organization, whether they

are called PATCO or they are called some other organization, is
semantical at the best.
I would, at this point, editorialize very strongly
a

st something that is coming into vogue at the present time,

automatic penalties.

Some people are having automatic divisions

for termination of strikers, automatic decertification of a
striking union, and some people have even gone so far as to say
they want a provision, providing, that no agreement, which is
otiated as the result of a work stoppage shall be binding.
I think such measures carry with them their own inherent weakness;
once the person decides to go on strike, these automatic provisions
are absolutely worthless.

And not only are they worthless in

terms of deterrents, there is a tremendous impediment to continue
n

otiations and any resolution of the dispute, because as with

PATCO, no one is talking, the people have been terminated, the
union has been decertified; and I too must say, not unlike the
chair that when I fly I do perhaps say a few more prayers than
I might have otherwise say when I fly.

I am happy that unlike

my colleague in UCLA, I was able to drive down here today rather
than rely on the airlines.

And I do pray, for the sake of all
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of us, that we don't have a situation where we have a single
fatality in this country that could arguably be aLtributable to
that labor dispute.
Another issue that comes up to be alluded to briefly,
is the damage issue, and this has to be a bifurcated question.
One, should the public employer involved be allowed to obtain
damages from the employees or the union engaged in a work stoppage
that is unlawful.

In a lower court case in this state, Pasadena

Unified School District vs. Pasadena Teachers, in the citation of
72 CALAP Third One Hundred the case of 1977.

An appeal to the

California Supreme Court was dismissed in an unreported citation.
The Court of Appeals allowed the struck employer to sue the union
for damages, on the grounds that the union impermissibly interfered
with an implied convenant, in the individual contract of employment,
that the public employees would not engage in work stoppage.

And

you might compare that decision with one in the State of Michigan,
the Lampatre School vs. Lampatre Teachers, 252 Northwest Reporter
Second, page 818, for the Michigan Supreme Court in 1977, provided
that there was no tort damage remedy available where a public
employer sues a union which engaged in unlawful strike.

If a

public employer were to have a damage right, I think it would be
most inappropriate to ever allow a damage right against the
individual employees engaged in the work stoppage.
I feel that way for two particular reasons: 1) not altogether clear in many cases whether the individual employee is
going on strike voluntarily.

Often they're caught up in the

social pressure, there may have been a vote to go on strike,

- 62 may have personally voted against it but believe in the
crat
a m
it.
awsu

process, and they may have decided to honor tne wishes
o ity of the

brothers and sisters

the bargaining

So it might be unfair in a particular case to allow any
against the individual.

2) the unconscionable hardships

ich would obviously result, if damages were available against
individual striker, should be obvious, and that was recognized
U.S.

erne Court last term in a case where they ruled

under 301, of the Labor Management Relations Act, where
e is a breech of contract strike, whether or not it has been
authorized or not by the representative labor organization,
es are not available for individual employees to participate
in the work stoppage.
Another issue is the one that was raised in a question,
ther third parties, injured by an unlawful work stoppage,
should be entitled to damages from the striking union.

I think

this poses a problem.

It is very difficult in many cases to

measure such damages.

There is no right in the private sector

to obtain damages if a private transit company went on strike,
if a private sanitation company went on strike; none of the
eople injured by that work stoppage would be entitled to damages
a

st the striking workers or their union.

The threat of

damages of this nature would clearly be devastating if I were
representing a labor union contemplating a work stoppage under
such circumstances.

I would make sure that their treasury was

diminished to a minimum, and I would try and make sure that in
no way would the employee have any liability, in which case,
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during a transit strike for shoppers who are unable to get to
the stores is effectively, whether they have the right to
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there are clearly cases where
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ith; they refuse to accord

s of the workers, the dignity and the respe
the statute, or perhaps other grievances of a

stantial and egregious nature, where it is very understandable
pe

le to recognize what it was that precipitated the work
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stoppage.

-

I think that there should be, as was recognized in the

ase of Holland School District vs. Education Association, the
itation is 157 Northwest Reporter Second, Page 206, where the
Mi

an Supreme Court,

1968, did recognize, expressly, that

if the provocation was extreme it would excuse or at least
mitigate the behavior of the public employees.

Even in the

private sector the National Labor Relations Board, in a case
lving the Coler Manufacturing Company, recognized that where
employees engaged in a protected work stoppage, engaged in unprotected conduct, or I should say really unprotected misconduct,
ich might otherwise have barred them from getting reinstated.
The labor board determined that, if their unprotected conduct
had been precipitated by substantial misconduct on behalf of
the employer involved, reinstatement would be appropriate to
insure that the employer did not unfairly benefit from its own
misconduct.

And I do think, with respect to public sector

strikes, it would be most unfortunate if we rewarded a public
employer, who engaged in unlawful behavior, by permitting it
to replace entirely employees who went out on strike in response
to that behavior.

Are there any questions that anybody would

like to ask?
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

Any questions from the panel?

Dr.

Craver, thank you very much.
DR. CRAVER:

Thank you very much, it's been a privilege

appearing here today.
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:

We appreciate your testimony.

Mathiason, attorney, Littler, Medelsen, Fastiff and Tichy.
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ffectively take over functions in this particular field which
brings me to my third point, and the one where I will SJend
st of my time this morning.
And that is, with the Public Employment Relations
Boa

, as it now exists, but with the concept of a Public
loyment Relations Board in the public sector, and the fact
t

as we see the decision of that board we see an agency which
lieve has overstepped bounds and has made some decision

h regard to carving out areas where they have found the
conduct to be lawful, where in fact I don't believe there is
statutory support for that or judicial support.
Let me return to the first proposition in that I
think it is a relatively simple one, and in listening closely
to the speakers that preceded me this morning, I find no real
substantiative difference with that proposition as to where
the common law stood in terms of labor disputes, and generally
that that is an evolution from statute, although they're
certainly arguments to be made.

The most current decision

that covers this particular area is with the City of Gridley,
IBEW vs. The City of Gridley, which was decided by the Third
District Court of Appeals on June 30, 1981, and is now, I
believe hearing has been granted to the California Supreme
Court.

There the court reaffirms what has been long standing

law in the Court of Appeals in California, that there is no
common law right to strike on the part of public employees;
and makes reference to the San Diego decision by saying,
basically that case does not apply here in that all administrative
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- 68 very recently, Senator Rodda, who authored the legislation of the
Rodda Act that we've come to know these days, made the

state-

~ublic

ment that it met him with great surprise, as he read the San Diego
decision, that there is even an assumption that in the passage of
that legislation there was some implied authority to engage in
strikes in the public sector.
Moving from the legislative arena to the courts, the
ifornia Supreme Court has voided commenting on this issue and
really avoided commenting on the issue before the 1979 San Diego
case.

You first find in the case going back to 1968, Enray Berry,

the court making what would normally be considered a wide judicial
pronouncement in basically striking down an injunction, that it
was unnecessary to get that question in that the injunction itself
was unconstitutional on other grounds.

Then we progressed to 1975,

and a very well known case, in which our firm participated, the
Cooper Decision, we find the court again avoiding the issue and
saying we don't really need to determine whether strikes are
illegal or not legal, we can even assume they're illegal, to
reach the conclusions raised here.

1979 presented, in my opinion,

a different circumstance, but only different in degree.

Where

we have the Supreme Court of California, looking as Professor
Alleyne described it as a situation involving a school district,
and looking at it from the standpoint of how do we deal with this
circumstance in the contempt power being used by the court.

In-

terestingly, in that decision, the court specifically states
that there is a controversy.

The court uses the word controversy

with regard to the issue of legality or illegality and I think
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an unfair practice?

it to b
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could it fashion a remedy to deal with the situation?

And the f

question, whether there was exclusive jurisdiction

the Pub ic

al

Employment Relations Board?
Turning to that first issue, the court on Page 8 of its
decision, explains, that

re is under the, what is call

Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) an impasse

edure.

The procedure contemplates that the parties are obligated, both
sides, to engage in a good faith use of those procedures.

ally

it would be a set of negotiations, following the set of negotiations one party or the other would determ
meetings would not be productive.

e

additi

al

They would then petition

Public Employment Relations Board for a declaration of impasse,
this is customarily granted by the Board after minimal investigation, normally by telephone, usually within 5 days.
there is then the appointment of a state mediator.

Following that,
The mediator

arranges for sessions with the parties, by statute 1s given
minimum of 15 days to operate with the two sides, and interestingly, then have the authority to determine that more than 15
days is necessary. perhaps as long as 3 years.

Although we
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't had that experience.

We have had in San Diego County

districts where it's gone as long as one year before

th~

media-

ens services released that authority and said we basically
annot help you any further.

After 15 days, one side or the

ther may request the use of the factfinding procedures, and at
discretion of the mediation service they may grant the
sition of factfinding, which again is nonbinding result,
would involve 3 parties.

One basically chosen by the parties

rom a list supplied by PERB, appointed by PERB, paid by PERB
usually then a management member and an employee member of
the panel.

This is an impasse procedure, and quite frankly,

well, it 1s imperfect.

I offer to you that in working with

about 10 percent of the district, Public School Districts in
California, this procedure as rocky as it has been at times,
has had surprisingly some very good results.

That brings me

back to the Supreme Court Decision.
The Court decision goes on to state that, the impasse
procedures almost certainly were included in the EERA for the
purpose of heading off strikes, I couldn't agree more, there is
no question but that type of procedure helps in that area.
Ms. Bogue, who spoke to you at the outset of these proceedings,
has done some work herself in her organization in terms of some
statistical data and some investigation of public sector strikes.
An interesting part of that is the tremendous number that
occurred before the impasse process is utilized or exhausted.
The overwhelming majority of them falling into that category at
being very rare, that a labor dispute occurs after that particular

- 71 procedure is exhausted.

The court then goes on

o state as in

its first holding, since they assume deferment o

a strike,

referring there to the Legislature, at least until their completion, (the completion of the impasse procedure) strikes
before then can properly be found to be a refusal to participate
in the impasse procedures in good faith, and thus an unfair
practice under Section 3543.6, Subdivision D.

The cite

they give for that is actually a treatise, which I authored
with two colleagues in my office suggesting exactly that.

That

failure to participate in that process is an unfair labor practice (unfair practice under the Rodda Act) and accordingly,
action could be taken by neutral government agency to at least
ensure completion of that particular process, that being the
impasse resolution process.

Separate from that, the court then

goes on to the question of whether the Public Employment Relations
Board can fashion an adequate remedy and there we find many of
the Sections that Professor Alleyne read, including the comment
of the court that harsh automatic sanctions often do not prevent
strikes and are counter productive.
I

thought as well.

I can concur with that

But the fact that the Public Employment

Relations Board might, in a particular circumstance, decide
that an injunction is not appropriate or different type of
penalty is not appropriate.

I don't think that in any way, 1s

an endorsement of the proposition that a strike in that circumstance would be lawful.

It would be instead, a judgment on a

case-by-case basis with the appropriate sanction or remedy is,
to be imposed by the Public Employment Relations Board and sought
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ter that

coming back to the courts system and mov

TUCKER:
MR. MATHIASON:
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:
MR. MATHIASON:
MR. BALD:
li

where

h

pass that

Mr. Mathiason.
Yes.
Mr. Bald has a question.

,

Okay.

Can collective bargaining exist in the

sector, in your experience, with your employers, in the

sence of the right to strike?
layers or for the employees?

Is it meaningful for the
Was Professor Alleyne's testi-

that if they did not have the right to strike they might as
11 not bother to bargain, right!
MR. MATHIASON:

Let me comment on that, cause I think

t's a fundamental question to a piece of legislation that
ontemplates collective bargaining.

It is also, something that

st of my work, the majority of the distil in the private sector
our law firm heavily in the private sector, where you've
a

ost grown up with the collective bargaining spirit and grown
th the, as I believe the wording you use, the strike being

ef

ctively the engine that makes the process work.

I suggest

close observation of the public sector, that the strike
alone is not the only motivating factor to make the process of
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collective bargaining work.

"I think that the threat," and I

use that really in quotes, other sanctions available for the
public organization, besides merely the withholding of services,
can generate incredible pressure on a public school employer,
apart from a basic commitment to the concept of collective bargaining, to come to the table and to effectively talk to the
other side and talk meaningfully.

•

The impasse procedure alone

is very different in the public sector from the private sector .
A school board, for example, makes a decision that it
wants to take an action and in order to do that the law says
you have to negotiate with your employee organization, that
impasse procedure could block the public school employer from
acting for well over a year.

That's an incredible impediment

and pressure that goes on the public body to sit down at the
table and talk, political pressure on school boards.

The

answer to my question, I believe is yes, collective bargaining
can work without the presence in every circumstance of a strike.
MR. BALD:

So could a carefully crafted law that per-

mitted, say the Public Employment Relations Board to prohibit

•

strikes under certain circumstances, reduce the number of strikes
without inhibiting the employee groups ability to bargain effectively for their members?
MR. MATHIASON:

I would suggest to you that, perhaps

even the current law we have interpreted in a particular fashion,
which isn't too far from what the Public Employment Relations
Board is doing, but different, could incourage a decrease in
the number of labor disputes, number one.

But, I offer number

- 74 , that there is no law, no matter what the Legislature can do,
is going to eliminate strikes.

You don't eliminate crime.

m not drawing an analogy, but laws saying this conduct is no
anger permissible does not mean that that conduct will not take
place.

You have to accept that it will in certain circumstances

take place and fashion the best legislation you can to allow the
collective process to work.

With as the court says, and I think,

islative action prior to that have, said continuation of vital
ervices and one of those services in the particular context
're discussing now would be education.

And I would offer

ther as a private prospective and definitely not a prospective I would think shared by most of my clients, that in some
circumstances, and I would like to get to that point, the acceptance of the strike by the public employer has occurred as a
v

icle of ultimately promoting the labor relations environment,

as strange as that may sound, but very much on a case-by-case
basis and with involvement of the employer, in that particular
process.
What I would offer as my observation, of the
decis~on,

~an Dieg~

is that the court found it unnecessary again to reach

the issue of legality of strikes.

That it did defer to the

Public Employment Relations Board as an unfair practice.

The

potential of the question of the employees refusing to participate in the impasse process, by going on strike as an unfair
practice, and ask the board to take original jurisdiction and
fashion appropriate remedies to handle that particular circumstance.

What I have seen happen; however, is something very
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much like Professor Alleyne described, and I th

in good faith

by the majority members of the Public Employment Relations Board
and that is an interpretation of the San Diego decision, saying
that under certain circumstances we the administrative agency
have effectively the authority to find that this conduct is lawful.
And I think that if you will look to the Fremont decision of the
Public Employment Relations Board, which was issued on June 19,
1980, its decision #136, you find a diccussion first by member
Moore and then a concurring discussion by now Chairman Gluck,
with regard to this very concept.

And advancing a proportion

that even before you go through the impasse process that under
certain circumstances we would find that there is no, per se,
illegal activity in engaging in a strike, and will look at the
context in which it occurred; we will look at what we believe
caused it to happen; and we will decide on a case-by-case basis
whether, therefore, that the conduct is permissible or not permissible.
Now let me share with you, separate from the academic
discussion of what the case law means.
I

What that has meant to

my practice, in the field of labor law, as I have dealt with
public school employers.
bargaining process.

We start working through the collective

We attempt to negotiate, and I would offer

to you the vast majority of the public school employers, do
attempt to meaningfully reach an agreement with their constituency with their particular unit and the major motivation,
surprisingly, are not avoidance of strike, they are:

1) that

that's what our constituents want us to do, it's a politically

-
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more acceptable thing; 2) it decreases the disharmony that might
t

rwise exist within the system, it's good for education.

A

er of positive factors going into it, suggesting they very
much would like to get this decided, plus a feeling of pressure
om the teachers in the community as constituents to reach this
point.
Separate from the strike vehicle, which is there and
much a part of the reality of California labor relations,
but I think only one of many of the factors and I'm not in most
c

cumstances definitely not the most important force that I see

working on my clients to reach agreement, they go to the bargaining table.

Because we now have the Fremont decision, we have the

Modesto decision, and we have a policy being taken by the Public
Employment Relations Board, that it will look at the unique
circumstances of every case, prior to the exhaustion of impasse,
you almost certainly ret, as the labor relations situation heats
up, an unfair practice charge filed against the employer.

Why?

Because should something happen, where the employees can't be
controlled, something blows up at the last minute, a one-day
work stoppage occurs, the argument is to be made by the employee
group, that in fact this was promoted by the employer, that the
employer acted in bad faith and inevitably we get a series of
these charges and we get a type of behavior that is built in,
almost to generate a record to establish this kind of bad faith
activity.

And no longer is there an acceptance, as I think was

almost suggested by the Supreme Court in San Diego, that at least
give the employer the opportunity to go through the impasse
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the public image and becomes a part of the dynamics of the whole
process as we try very hard to reach agreement.
A classic in this regard, is an unreported event, involving a strike that took place with the Santa Clara County
employees, a very bitter strike, unfortunately, was resolved.
After the strike was over and through the use of the Publ
Employment Relations Board, where an injunction was sought,
there is then a very formal process that takes place with
regard to a hearing on it, and the parties were prepared to
eliminate any need for a hearing and wanted a very simple
stipulation improved by the Public Employment Relations Bo

•

wh

h said, that since this strike took place before the impasse

procedures were exhausted, it was, therefore, unlawful and was
an unfair practice.

The Public Employment Relations Board

rejected that and accepted the proposition that you needed to
show that there were circumstances here which suggested that
t

re were not unique actions by the employer

ich could have

triggered; therefore, a lawful strike prior to the exhaustion
of the impasse procedure.
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It's a limited message I have to give to you today,
but I'm offering you as a practitioner, and someone whose interested in avoiding strikes, that the use of the impasse
procedure and making the procedure almost, per se, a requirement,
a prerequisite, before the Public Employment Relations Board
deeply goes into the question of the conduct of the parties with
regard to legality or illegality of a strike, would be a very
helpful look for me in eliminating unnecessary unfair labor
practice charges, and in making that process work more effectively.

With all the pressures of collective bargaining still

there and leaving somewhat open, and this is where I'm sure I
can part with from my constituency, the question of what then
happens after that impasse procedure has been exhausted, and
the parties have gone through mediation, they have gone through
factfinding, they have gone through post factfinding mediation,
then what recourse is open.
laterally?

Can the public employer act uni-

What responses are available for the employees under

those circumstances?

It is at this stage that I think you have

a much harder determination to make as to whether the Legislature
should be involved, and make a clear determination on the
options open to the public school employer or public employers
at that point, versus the labor organization.
In summarizing, what I am suggesting, by way of conclusions and actions that this committee might take, and ultimately
the Legislature.

I would suggest that:

1) strikes are reduced

by the utilization of the whole impasse procedure.

I would

suggest; 2) that it be, per se, an unfair practice, to go on
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What about a labor dispute of the potential of the strike?

The response was fine, we'll replace them at that point and we'd
like to stay as far away from the Public Employment Relations
Board as we can.

No problem, we aren't concerned about the str

in that circumstance, we'll deal with that through replacements
or with every other mechanism open to us.

We don't want the

involvement of the Public Employment Relations Board.
I suggest to you, rather than the strike, before go
through impasse, the use of the board in investigating that case
and going into court with regard to a position of behavior ta
by the employer, much more devastating to that employer.

A pub-

lic school employer is a formidable adversary, at a bargaining
if you are engaging in that kind of relation.

Dealing as much as

I do in the private sector versus the public sector, in a
circumstance where a body has decided that it is going to take
a position and hold to it, the powers available to the public
employer are incredible, by comparison to what most private
employers have at their disposal and can utilize.

And I think

in that regard we have seen the use of the strike vehicle being
recognized more and more by organized labor in the public sector
is not always to their best interest.

And, in fact, some very

unsuccessful strikes, in the public sector, have occurred in
the past couple of years, which I think has encouraged reduction in the number.

And I would offer beyond that at least

utilization of the impasse procedures, becomes a tool available
for the parties which should have the effect of reducing the
number of strikes; and more than that has a real pressure on the
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of their obligation of good faith bargaining, and as a prerequisite to even getting to the question of whether they can or
cannot strike.

Accordingly, a court, a Public Employment Rela-

tions Board, or the California Supreme Court can say we are not
reaching the issue of whether a strike is lawful or not; but we
are requiring that in each circumstance you go through the
impasse procedures and utilize those first and relay on some
statistical evidence that would suggest that when you do that
you decrease the likelihood that there ultimately will be a
strike.

Then you're faced with the tough legislative decision,

which I don't envy having to make, I know where the public is
on the issue.

And that is, once all of this is said and done,

you then at that point allow a strike to take place lawfully
or not and you have the traditional arguments with regard to
services that cannot be interrupted.

I think an example of that

is the military service versus services that might in one context be private, while one context be public, interruption
may not nearly be as serious, with regard to the public as it
otherwise would be.
And then the whole question that I think was elegant
just addressed just a few minutes ago, what sanctions do you
impose.

As a caveat to that I would add that I've spent a con-

siderable amount of time recently, in the State of New York,
with public unions and employers and I would suggest under the
Taylor Act the potential of the two for one fine seems to be
treated with much greater respect than a court injunction, or
the procedures available to us in California.
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that the views that I express here are inconsistent with those
generally held by employee organizations.
The topic that I would like to discuss, at the outset,
has to do with the status of the law respecting public employee
strikes at this time.

I would like to give you my view as to

what I think that that law is or is likely to become.

I put

it that way, because, if the courts do what I suspect that they
will be doing in the course of the future years, they will say
that that's the way it was in the past as well and they are
only uncovering what the law really is and not creating a new
law.

The starting point for this analysis, has to be with

recent California Supreme Court Decision in the San Di
Association case.

In approaching that case, I am going to keep

in mind what I think is a proper way to inquire into decisiona
law, which is kind of a common law developed in our country.
Looking not only at what the court has said in that case, but
also what it has done.

I hope that the academicians that I have

testified here earlier will concur that this is frequently a
useful way of evaluating decisions.

There are many occasions

when more can be discerned as to the meaning of a case by looking at what;

in fact, the court did, then perhaps, what they

have said or what they have not said.
The courts said, in the San Diego case, that PERB has
exclusive initial jurisdiction, at least, to evaluate the
question of illegality of the work stoppage that occurred there
under the Rodda Act.

The court held that the contempts

adjudications, which have issued in the case, were invalid
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- 86 If I am right, and if that is the limitation of
authority of PERB, there is a very important consequence that
follows.

The law generally, with respect to employees stri

s

public employee strikes, I should say in California, has rus
on court determinations going to matters having to do with
public policy, and grounds that have never related to good
faith negotiations.

Let me put it a little bit more clearly

so that you will not miss my point, Mr. Chairman.

It is true

that the District Courts of Appeal have generally held in
California, at least prior to the

enact~ent

that public employee strikes were illegal.

of the Rodda

t

Now there has been

a number of grounds upon which those decisions have rust
ranging, I suppose, from the old and what I would regard as
anachronistic doctrine of sovereign unity to the fact that
governmental services are essential to the notion that t
government has a non-del

able responsibility to determine t

matters that lay in the area of collective bargaining and
perhaps there are other grounds as well.

But at no time,

there been any suggestion, by any of the decisions, that
lie employee strikes were illegal because of some impact of
the obligation to negotiating in good faith, that is a creat
of the Rodda Act.
Now lets come back to the closing of the Supreme Court
in the SanDi

o case.

The parties were told that a district,

a school district in that particular

circu~stance,

has the

obligation to go to PERB and for that reason, whatever the law
might be in regard to public strikes generally, there can be no

injunction is

d

Chairman,
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law were to
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- 88 MR. BEESON:

Are you referring to Section 923 being

called inapplicable?
MR. BALD:

The concerted action rather says, that

nothing in the act should be construed to give school employees
those rights.
MR. BEESON:

Yes, and if I'm not mistaken, that's

precisely what the Supreme Court said in San Diego.

You will

find that written into the decision, but that particular
provision in Rodda, which makes inapplicable Section 923, does
not have the meaning that strikes subject to, with respect to
employer subject to the Rodda Act, are illegal.

I think that's

clear.
Now the full range of the full impact of what I have
said, as I have already indicated, is not to be found in the
decision, but I think that that necessarily is going to be the
way in which the law develops, because I see no escape from
the logic.

Now to some extent I think that that has already

been borne out by what PERB has done in the more recent Fremont
Case.

PERB there looked upon conduct which, incidentally, was

not a full-blown strike in the conventional sense, but rather
two separate sick out days which were separated by a number of
days and plus a policy of so-called working by the rule.

That

is, not performing any services of an extra cirricular nature,
which has been the practice down through the years.

In looking

at those particular practices, which certainly I suppose could
be regarded as work stoppages in the general sense, PERB found
that they did not because of the circumstances of that case,

- 89 reflect any kind of bad faith approach to the meet and negotiating obligation which the organization had, rather the board
found that the sick out response was an effort to force t
employer to abandon bad faith bargaining and try to come to
some kind of resolution of the dispute.

Accordingly, the charg s

that those work stoppages constituted an unfair practice were
dismissed.

Now this holding of PERB in Fremont, has more

recently been sustained by the District Court of Appeal for
the first Appellate District, in a decision which is dated
November 30th of this year, that's just a very recent decision
in a matter of a week or so ago that it came.

This, I think

lends further emphasis to the propriety of holding that there
will be an area of legal strikes, at least under the Rodda Act,
which will be recognized by decision law as the time goes on.
I would like to make a small detour in what I am
going to say next to refer to a statement by Mr. Mathiason,
I believe this really was one of the most important points
that Mr. Mathiason wanted to get across in his remarks to the
Committee.

I refer to Mr. Mathiason's assistance that there

be a recognition of the impasse procedures, before an exhausting
of those procedures, before any strike can take place.
suggestion, at this time, is contrary to current law.
Frem~n!,

That
In

the two stoppages occurred during the course of the

impasse procedures.

The first stoppage occurred, I think, the

day after the first impasse session took place and the second
stoppage occurred several days later, but before the impasse
procedures had been completed.

The holding as I've indicated,

both by PERB
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- 91 The theory and practice of collective bargaining, as
it has evolved in the private sector, pre-supposes some k
balance or equation
table.

o

the power of the parties who came t

The employers power is obvious because it controls

makes decisions on what the terms and conditions of employment
shall be.

Employees power is e

her meaningless or much more

difficult to exercise unless there is some sort of economic
weapon that they can bring to bare.

The economic weapon, of

course, traditionally has been the strike.

This means,

essence, that collective bargaining as it has been developed
and practiced down through the years, means necessarily that
there is the employers ability and power to make decisions
and put them into effect on one side and the employees r
to withhold their services on the other side of the equation.
The notion has very respectable credentials.

I could refer

you to any number of scholarly works, where this point has be
made; but I would like particularly to state that the United
States Supreme Court has made the point in a decision, in 1957
which is not too frequently cited these days, namely National
Labor Relations Board vs. Lyon Oil

Campa~.

That's a decjsion

in 1957 which was cited at 352 of the State's report, page 282.
The question there was whether a union which had in effect
reopened a contract pursuant to a reopening clause could stri
in the face of what appeared to be somewhat ambiguous language,
in Section 8-D of the National Labor Relations Act, that
seemingly required the union to keep in effect, the terms and
conditions that were in a contract without striking until

determination

e of the contract.
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we wouldn't need any laws relating to collective barga
The laws are written primarily, I suppose, to assure
happens and give some legal sanction behind that assuranc
circumstances where employers or perhaps 1

or organiz

are reluctant to behave in the way in which the law
practice of collective barga

ing contemplates.

dealing with problem areas

looking at the decis

this area and by look

So we ar
s

at what the law is, we are not c

pelled so much to worry about what may happen
areas.

non-

I would suggest that in the problem areas,

re

employee organization is faced with a school district or
another public employer which is reluctant to underst
practice good faith negotiations, that there is ve

1 tt

the long run which can be done by the employee organiz ti
through other mechanisms; publicity demonstrations,

t

of that kind; that will be meaningfully as far as
1s concerned.

The ultimate weapon must be the right to

their services.
It is, of course, ironic that the pol

t

country promoting collective bargaining, has as its ob
the peaceful settlement of disputes and yet has as one o

1

indispensable elements, the right to strike and they occa
use the right to strike.

That's built into the tens

collective bargaining has been practiced and there are t
c1ans who can explain far better than I can, why it wor
it is enough as far as this Committee should be concern
think, to know and understand that it has worked.

That it

o
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been accepted on a very broad basis as a policy under which
labor relations have been conducted in this country both in the
public sector and the private sector, and that the continued
acceptance of an understanding that that tension must exist,
will do a great deal to make the whole collective bargaining
theory operate on a successful basis.
One of the questions that was asked, I believe, of
the first witness who testified here today, was whether the
holding in San Diego, and perhaps implications which I have
alluded to in that decision, would be applicable beyond the
Rodda Act itself.

I can only speculate on that, but I think

it's worthy of consideration.

The Higher Education Employment

Relations Act, and the State Employer Relations Act, which are
also subject to the jurisdiction of the administration of PERB,
have similar but not identical provisions dealing with the
bargaining process.

In the Rodda Act, the phrase is used "the

obligation to meet and negotiate in good faith."

In the other

two acts you will find the phrase, ''meet and confer in good
faith,'' which is a similar phraseology to that which exists
in Meyers-Milias-Brown.

So we do have a variety of legal re-

gulations applicable to various parts of the public sector and
we do have some differences in language.

I think, however,

in the practical application many distinctions which may exist
between meeting and conferring in good faith, meeting and
negotiating in good faith, are so technical and overly refined
as to probably be meaningless.

If the negotiation process

or across the table discussions which are contemplated as a
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way of resolving disputes in the public sector, is to have
meaning, I should think that the general principles which I
have discussed would be applicable in all of these pieces
legislation.

Ultimately if the matter is permitted to evolv

through decisional law, rather than through legislative law,
that what has happened in the Rodda Act should and will occur
with respect to the other pieces of legislation as well.
I would like to make just one or two comments on
happens in connection with strike situations as I have obse
them in public sector as well as the private sector that may h
some meaning in the connection with deliberations of the comm
It is a common place to talk about the employee organizati
engaging in a strike as though the organization itself was a
single entity with a single leader, and a single voice and
without taking into consideration the fact that his 1s a democratic organization.

I think that's a problem that has to

in that fact of life, recognized in trying to make some kind
sense out of what happened in connection with strikes.

I su

that school districts who have encountered strikes, at least

•

this is my experience, like to point the finger at a particular
leader or a particular group of leaders, and say this is t

1

responsibility, and this is what they have done, and the employees who are involved in this thing have bad leadersh
That ordinarily is not the case.

The fact is quite the oppos t

In more strikes than not, and I am coming very close to home to
a many number of situations of which I have been involved in;
the leadership of an employee organization facing impasse

- 96 bargaining, not knowing what to do, spends an inordinate amount
and trouble t

ing to avoid the strike; trying to find some s

tion by which will be ace

table to their constituency so t

strike will not have to take place.

More often than not,

you will find that the pressure for a strike wells up

om

constituent body itself rather than being a reflection of the
ideas and predispositions of the leadership.

This is a con

quence, and I'm not making any judgments of any kind on a mo
or ethical basis, but it's a consequence of the way in
labor organizations operate on a democratic basis.

1

There is

nothing more familiar to me than to attend a membership meet
at which time a large group of people will attend, whereas,
with respect to lesser matters on the agenda, you may
ficulty getting very many people to attend the meetings.

e difA 1

group of members will attend to discuss the question of stri
and inflammatory speeches will be made from the floor, emotiona
outbreaks will take place about what a terrible situation bar
gaining has gotten itself into, and how bad the employers are.
The determination to strike is the consequence of that kind of
broad scale voice of the members rather than being an
of what the leadership would like to see.

res

1

I don't make any con

elusions, I don't draw any conclusions necessarily from
have said, but it is a point which I would like to have con

de

because the problems of strikes, I think, is a problem mostly
with respect to the membership and not with respect to the

e

e

It has been said earlier, during the course of thi
session, that strikes can be devastating to labor organizat

s
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and this is true, strikes can be devastating to employers as
well, and that has occasionally occurred.

That is not,

why strikes are permitted, either in the private sector

not

why they should be permitted in the public sector; rather
the function of the str

it

to be able to keep the employer g

off guard enough in a question of bargaining, so that there
always the lack of certainty as to what will happen that

•

promote settlement.

s
1

When the strike does, in fact occur, the

experience, I think, will show (and I haven't tried to

term

whether or not the materials that were introduced on the basis
of which the area of testimony was given) that once the stri
has occurred in a particular bargaining relationship, it's ve
unlikely that there will be a recurrence of that strike in th
same bargaining relationship immediately thereafter in the
following contract.

Ordinarily, if a strike takes place both

sides will have learned enough from it and dislike it enough
so that neither will want to have the experience repeated.
That is part of this sort of inherent inconsistance in the
collective bargaining process, where we have to invite strikes
in the sense and make strikes available as part and parcel of
the long range objective of being able to avoid strikes and
being able to resolve matters on a peaceful basis.

Mr. Chairm

I think that that concludes what I wanted to say this morn
if there are any questions I would be happy to deal with them.
CHAIRMAN TUCKER:
your testimony.

Mr. Beeson, thank you very much for

Chuck Cole, Executive Director of the Public

Employees Relations Board. come on up, Chuck.

- 98 MR. CHUCK COLE:

Chairman Tucker, members of the

Committee and staff, thank you very much for the opportuni
to join you today and share my thoughts on the important issue
of the legality of the right to strike for public employees
California.

My comments today will principly be direct

towards answering that question as it relates to the
Educational Employment Relations Act.
As you know, I'm the Executive Director of the Public
Employment Relations Board, which has jurisdiction now over the
Educational Employment Relations Act, State Employer-Employee
Relations Act, and Higher Education Employer-Employee Relation
Act.

I would initially like to begin by sharing with you the

thought that the impasse provisions, as you have heard so
eloquently described earlier today, of mediation and fact-find
are remarkably successful, and I think that's important to note
some statistics that reflect that success.
There are approximately 2,000 units in place, in
California School Districts.

In 5 years that represents approxi

mately 10,000 negotiation rounds in which the parties have s
to reach an accord on an interest dispute or an interest matter.
We've had approximately 1,800 mediations occur.

We've had

out

180 fact-findings occur, and those have largely resulted in
settlements of those differences and have resulted in contractua
agreements.

I think that's a credit to the parties, to the

Legislature and the Governor for enacting the statute, to the
mediators involved in the field, and the fact-finders in the
effort to assist the parties in raching settlements of their disputes.

- 99 As you heard this morning from Bonnie Bogue, there
certainly have been some interest strikes that which have
occurred.

I think that since the passage of the Rodda Act,

it's very unlikely that we will see, we certainly haven't
since its passage, and it's unlikely we will ever see recognition strikes, or rights disputes strikes occur.

A careful

analysis of the strikes which have occurred, will show that

•

many of them occurred without the completion of the statutory
impasse proceedings.

Additionally, some of them occurred with

an exclusive representative in place under the Rodda Act
therefore, were outside of the EERA when they occurred.

I

would now like to turn my attention to the case that is so
often cited, the San Di

o Teachers Association vs. the

Court of San Diego County in 1979 decision.

erior

For the sake of

brevity, Professor Alleyne had recited the facts earlier this
morning, and I won't

take the time to do that.

But suffice it

to say that again, the association sued the Superior Court t
set aside the contempt citation that was granted by the cour
Thereby, arguing among other things, that the advent of the
EERA implyingly granted a right to strike.

At that point the

Public Employment Relations Board was not involved with t
court case.

The Superior Court ruling was affirmed by the

Court of Appeal, and the matter was appealed to the State
Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court then asked the Public Employm nt

Relations Board to respond to several questions.

The agency

advised the court that it could not give a definitive response
to the questions in the matter without actually having a case

- 100 before it, but it would make an effort to speculate in response
to the courts questions.

The court asked if a strike might con-

stitute an unfair practice, and the PERB majority said yes, and
listed two examples:

1) A strike without completion of the

statutory impasse proceedings; 2) A strike to achieve demands
without negotiating for those demands.

The court also asked if

PERB had the authority to seek injunctive relief in strike cases,
and the PERB majority again responded that EERA provided that
PERB would have exclusive initial jurisdiction over determinations of unfair practice charges.

Therefore, to the extent

that a party alleges that a strike constitutes an unfair
practice, the matter might be enjoinable and should come to
PERB first, although PERB's decision then would ultimately be
appealable to the courts.
It should be noted that the above responses made to
the court, were made by a majority of the board.

In a separate

dissenting Amicus filing, one board member argued that strikes
violated the common law and are; therefore, per se, unlawful.
The Supreme Court specifically rejected the latter argument,
and did not answer the question of whether strikes are, per se,
unlawful under the common law.

The individual member also

argued that the reference to Labor Code Section 923 made in the
EERA, would also make strikes unlawful under the Act.

The

court specifically rejected that argument, holding that the
EERA provisions, merely did not extend the school employees
those specific rights granted to private sector employees
by Section 923 of the Labor Code.

- 101 The court further advised, that PERB should not grant
injunctions, or sanctions, automatically, which should use its
expertise to further the purposes of the act.

The court con-

cluded that strikes which were unfair practices were enjoinable,
and also ruled that PERB had exclusive initial jurisdiction over
what constitutes an unfair practice.

The court vacated the con-

tempt citation, and indicated that when an injunction is sought,
the request should initially be made of PERB and not the courts.
The majority of response to the Supreme Court's questions, never
addressed the common law status or legality of strikes questioned.
The majority contended that PERB had no jurisdiction to interpret
the common law and that is still the agencies belief.
It should be noted that the board has not yet had the
opportunity to decide the question of whether a strike is illegal
under the EERA, or all statutory requirements have been met by an
employer organization.

The Supreme Court left open the question

of whether a strike which doesn't violate EERA, might still constitute an unlawful act under the common law.
the San Di

As a result of

o case, the board adopted rules which provide for a

very compressed investigative time line in which the board's
general council reports to the board within 48 hours after
receipt of a request in recognition of the nature of the rights
and interest which are involved.

A board decision to seek in-

junctive relief related to a specific unfair practice charge,
is based on an evaluation of two things:

1)

the charge would prevail when heard; and, 2)

The likelihood that
The potential for

irreparable harm should the injunctive relief not be sought.
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TUCKER:
wants to
to

esti

ee to do

1

at this time.
Nobody.

I want you

Come on up, you've got a
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In addition to the references made at today's heari~gs interested
persons may wish to review the "Final Report of the Assembly Advisory
Council on Public Employee Relations" (March 15, 1973) and "Strikes
by Public Employees: The Consequences of Legislative Inattention''
by Laura V. Best, 20 Santa Clara Law Review 945 (1980).
Respectfully Submitted,

William D. Heekin, Jr.
Executive Director, CIPEC

By Bonnie
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The fluctuations, of course, depend on the length of strikes and number of employees
involved. In J980, the largest strike in manday terms was a 6-day walkout that idled 5,600
people, producing 33,600 lost employee days (City of Los Angeles). However, 1979 had three
strikes, each of which exceeded the 100,000 manday mark: 163,400 in the San Francisco Unified
School District's 43-day strike, 151,800 in the Southern California Rapid Transit District's 23day strike, and 136,950 in BART's 83-day lockout/strike. (SCRTD's two all-time records for a
single agency still have not been approximated - 265,200 mandays in 1974 and 240,500 in
1976.)
Although the 122 strikes experienced in California's public sector in 1979 and 1980
represent an increase of 40 per cent over the 87 strikes in the 1977-78 period, the number of
mandays lost in 1979 and 1980 increased by 115 per cent, which is perhaps a better measure of
the impact of these strikes on employees and on the delivery of services. The number of individual employees who participated in a strike or sickout (or lockout) in 1979-80 increased by 67
per cent over the 1977-78 period to a new high of 59,121 workers.
1

See discussion of the basic law on public sector strikes in California in CPER No. 18, pp. 2-17. Subsequent litigation has affected the rights of employees engaged in strikes and the validity of strike settlement agreements, but has not altered the basic holdings of the cases noted in this earlier discussion.
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Public

on the current status of the law on
indicates that you have an outstanding
assist the Committee in its hearreason for writing is to urge
members of his Committee to consider
and decisional history of public sector labor
to strikes by public employees. Having
session of the Legislature from 1939 until 1975
in all committee hearings insector labor relations, I am familiar with the
and most of the decisions.
the members of the Committee understand
the reasons why we believe
law with respect to public sector employee
California has not changed--strikes bx public employees
unless authorized by the Legislature.
II

the principal discussion in public employee
California and the more liberal eastern
employees to participate in oractivities and to engage in collective bargaining.
of the law and practice in the public sector for
in "Labor Unions and Municipal Employee
General Counsel, National Institute of
In California the earliest cases made it
purpose of the Legislature in enacting
Code to inaugurate a state policy with
which would be applicable to the
subdivisions. (Nutter v. City of Santa
1946)). The Nutter case made clear
and governmental employment. Althe Santa Monica bus transit system, the
that a different rule should apply with
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ments
would
of their own
the divided

to join a bona fide labor organiits passage by the Assembly was
from "collective bargaining" to
Senate committee. There was no action by
which would have made the provisions of Sec--local government entities. The reason
with all of their acknowledged strength
which would make organizational activities
Perez decision which has never been overruled •
number
enforcement functions in some fire departwere fearful of a rash of local regulations which
from joining unions not composed entirely
affiliated with internationals which might raise
• union interests) issue discussed in Perez.
introduced to extend Section 923 to public employees:
1729
was no action on any of the bills, all of
or police organizations.

It seems apparent at this point that if public safety employees could be prohibited
from joining unions that they certainly didn 1 t have any right to strike. With
apologies to Charles Scully because he heard this quote at so many committee hearings in the
s it
here to at least quote in part Labor's
greatest defender

•

"Particularly,
want to
my conviction that militant tactics
have no place in the functions of any organization of Government employes.
in the Federal service rests the obligation to
serve the
• whose interests and welfare require orderliness
and
conduct of Government activities. This obligation
is
Since their own services have to do with the functioning
of the Government, a strike of public employes manifests nothing less
than an intent on their
to prevent or obstruct the operations of
Government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of Government by those who have sworn to suppo~t
it, is unthinkable and intolerable." (Franklin D. Roosevelt)
In 1959 Assemblymen McMillan and George Brown authored AB 602 which would have
added Section 923.5 to the Labor Code to extend Section 923 to all local government entities when
organizations of "non-uniformed employees". The
bill was amended to strike out "organizations of non-uniformed employees" and to
insert 11with
ions of employees other than policemen or deputy sheriffs;
subject to the constitution and the laws of the state and the provisions contained
in the charter and
ordinances and regulations of cities, counties and
political subdivisions.
While approved by the policy committee, the bill died on
the Assembly file. It is clear that the Legislature was reluctant even to permit
certain safety
to join labor organizations and engage in collective bargaining.
• the militant tactics involved in a strike did not have to be
addressed.
there were strikes in California and elsewhere even in
those
were deemed unlawful by the public and the courts.
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McMillan's AB 618 was approved adding
authorizing firefighters to join any bona
of their choice but expressly prohibiting strikes by
and also for the first time indicating that the enactment did not
extend Section 923 of
Labor Code to public agencies or their employees.
Prior to the
618 the League Board of Direcl"rs in recognition
---t-o organize and the fact that 70/~ of public emthe
10 000 population were already organized withwhich would make it unlawful for the state or
obstruct the right of firefighters to join bona
ions of their own choice. Even with League opposition withdrawn the bill was refused passage
the Senate the first time it was brought
up for action.
dates
(1959) and the Los Angeles Transit decision (1960)
the
as
enacted included both an express strike
prohibition and a statement that Section 923 could not be interpreted to apply
to public employees. The latter section is the heart of private industry employee
organizational and co
bargaining rights. It also guarantees the freedom
of private sector
to engage in concerted activities (strikes) for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. The several
guarantees of Section
include the right to a) associate and organize, b) to
designate employee representatives, c) to negotiate terms and conditions of employment, d) to be free from intimidation or coercion, and e) to engage in concerted
(strike or other) activities for the purpose of collective bargaining. The firefighter sponsors of AB 618, as introduced, sought the first (association and
organizaton) right directly and expressly and the four others by implication. When
AB 618 was first amended on March 23, 1959, the firefighters also expressly sought
the right "to
collectively through representatives of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Only
the right to strike was denied them. The second amendment when the bill was still
in the house of origin amounted to a complete revision reading substantially as
enacted. When so revised Section 923 was expressly made inapplicable. The only
Senate amendment also prohibited picketing. Eighteen months later in 1960 in the
Los Angeles Transit case, the California Supreme Court made it clear to all of us
that absent authorization by the Legislature strikes by public .;mp Loyees were unlawful and that Section 923-type rights to engage in concerted activities include
legislative authorization to strike.
To go back
to the post World War II period, it must also be remembered that
private transit systems for a variety of reasons were being taken over by public
agencies. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and other unions had represented
private transit employees in all of their collective bargaining negotiations with
private transit owners. We recognized that there had been long established labormanagement relationships and in all of the legislative acts authorizing local public
entities to operate public transit systems or creating transit authorities you will
find provisions dealing with employer-employee relations \vhich include language
similar to Section 923 of the Labor Code. The League did not oppose any of these
provisions where a public transit district was replacing a private transit operation.
The League recognized the distinction between public transit employees who had been
private transit
and all other public employees. The first time this issue
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came before the court was in Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. The
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 54 C. 2d 684 (October 1960), where it was conwere without the legal right to strike because they were
entity. The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority
Act included
following language:

I

shall have
self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor
, to bargain collectively
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection •..• Notwithstanding
any other provision of this act .•• the authority ••. shall enter
into a written contract with the accredited representatives of
[its] employees governing wages, salaries, hours and working
conditions •••. " (Underlining
The
is identical to the
of Section 923. Before the court considered the quoted language, Chief Justice Gibson speaking for a majority of the
court said:
"In the absence of legislative authorization, public employees
in general do not have the right to strike (see 31 A.L.R.2d 1142,
1159-1161), and the questions presented here are whether the act
creating the transit authority gave its employees such a right and,
whether the statute is constitutional as applied to the emrepresented by the brotherhood." (Emphasis added)
The court held that the right to engage "in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" constituted
authorization for the public transit employees to strike and compared that
language to similar wording found in federal statutes and uniformly interpreted as
including the right to strike. The two dissenting justices did not want to go as
far as the court majority and imply a legislative grant of such a right to strike
the
It therefore was the unanimous view of the California
Court in 1960 that in the absence of legislative authorization there was
to strike. To say that the issue is an open one in the Supreme Court ig~ores
this legislative and decisional history and, in effect, says that policemen who
can be prohibited from joining non-police unions nevertheless may strike but firefighters cannot.
the dates of the enactment of Labor Code Sections 1960-1963 and the
of the Supreme Court's decision in the Los Angeles Transit Authority case, it is
clear
in
out of a super abundance of caution the Legislature included both
express strike prohibition with respect to firefighters and non-applicability of
Section 923. After the Supreme Court's decision in October of 1960 when it said
the absence of legislative authorization public employees in general do not have
the
to strike," it no
was necessary to include an express strike prohibition. It was totally adequate in all subsequent legislation to simply indicate
of Section 923 both with respect to collective bargaining general
activities
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To summarize, public employee strikes always have been unlawful in California
except when authorized by the Legislature. Prior to the Los Angeles Transit
case and out of a super abundance of caution Sections 1960-1963 authorizing
firefighter association and organization activities expressly prohibited strikes
and also made Section 923 inapplicable to public employees. After Los Angeles
Transit in 1960 it no longer was necessary for the Legislature in public sector
relations acts to do more than provide for inapplicability of Section 923.
Decisional law was clear and the Legislature relied on it.
With all your experts you should have a full discussion of the many District
Court of Appeal decisions which have held that strikes by public employees are
lawful. Hearings by the Supreme Court after such decisions generally have been
denied. The fact that there have been many strikes by public employees in no
way makes such strikes lawful. There are many drunk drivers but no one would
suggest that we make drunk driving lawful. If the Supreme Court wants to
late validity of strikes (San Diego Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court, 24 C.
)
then the Supreme Court will be responsible for changing long established
policy. It appears to me that the Legislature would not enact legislation
as a matter of public policy that strikes by public employees are
Si~ely,
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